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THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

THE DOCTRINE OF
MAYA

In the Philosophy of the Vedanta

By

PRABHU DUTT SHASTRI

Ph.D. {Kiel), M.A., M.O.L., B.T. {Pb.), B.Sc. Lit. Hum.
(Oxon.), of Christ Church, Oxford

Government of India Research Scholar {Sanskrit) ; Boden Research Grant,
Oxford (1910) ; Theological Exhibitioner of Manchester College,
Oxford; Member of the Oxford Philosophical Society; lately
Associate of the Society for Psychical Research, London;
Professor of Sanskrit, Oriental College, and First Eng-
lish Master and Lecturer in Psychology at the
Government Training College, Lahore ; In-
spector and Examiner of Rishikula,
Hardwar ; etc., etc.

LONDON
LUZAC AND CO

(publishers to the INDIA office)

46, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, W.C

191 1

Butler & tanner,
The Selwood Printing WORKS,

FROMB, AND LONDON.

PREFACE

The Doctrine of Maya is the pivotal principle in
the Advaita Philosophy — the final pronouncement
of Indian speculation on the conception of ReaUty
and Appearance. During the last thirty years a
good deal has been written on the Vedanta, and
naturally this doctrine has also been treated of,
though only in passing and by the way. That it is
richly supported in the later Vedanta is already
an estabhshed fact, but a number of writers seem
to conclude, rather hastily, that it is not the genuine
product of the early speculation of the Upanisads,
but has been later added to the original Vedanta
by Sankara and his followers. Some critics believe
that it is imported from Buddhism and receives
hardly any countenance from the Upanisads. The
point is still debated, and it is only with a view to
contribute a little towards a clearer imderstanding
on this problem that I undertook to examine the
Upanisads as minutely and as fully as I could,
always relying upon the original texts more than
the many more or less slipshod translations which
are to be found. Hitherto these treatises have

vi PREFACE

been looked upon as paradoxical, inconsistent
and unsystematic. Scholars have only dashed at
them to get out some meaning, but have hardly
attempted to see if there existed in them an inner
principle of unity and system. Deussen has, of
course, indicated in bis Geschichte the evolution of
thought within the Upanisads, and has attempted
to base their chronology on such internal evidence.
Working independently on the original texts of the
Upanisads, I have also reached practically the same
conclusion, hence in Chapter II have enlarged and
developed that scheme with the aid of aU the more
important passages bearing on each point. My
method has been analytical, more appropriately
synthetico-analytic ; I have not stated a fact
dogmatically, but have in every instance supported
it with appropriate references, an examination of
which will lead us inductively to the estabhshed
conclusion. To those who do not hold the same
view as I, a statement here and there may appear
a little dogmatic, but that hardly touches me, since
I have kept out aU questions of personal belief and
have only made an honest attempt to treat the
question scientifically. To press one's own per-
sonal belief and point of view in a scientific inquiry
vitiates, I beheve, the conclusions to be arrived at.
On the question whether the conception of Maya
is found in the literature from Sankara down to the
present day, all opinions conciir. The point to be
investigated is how far and to what extent the con-

PREFACE vii

ception is to be traced in the earlier literature before
the time of Sankara (who flourished about a thou-
sand years before his spiritual disciple, Schopen-
hauer). Hence I have confined my inquiry to the
Vedic literature, especially the Upanisads, and
have carried my investigation down to Sankara.
My conclusions are (i) that the conception of Maya
is as old as some of the later books of the Rgveda
where its forms are clearly noticeable, and that it
gradually developed through the speculation of the
Upanisads, and passing through the hands of
Gaudapada and Sankara was crystallized into a
technical form, elaborated more and more as time
went on ; (2) that the word " Maya," in the sense
of " illusion " of course, occurs later — for the first
time in the Svetaivatara Upanisad (iv. 10) ; and
(3) that most of the critics of Maya have started
with gratuitously assuming Maya to be a concrete
reality, standing face to face with the Absolute as
it were, a tertium quid between the Absolute and
the Universe — and this has made their whole criti-
cism futile and irrelevant. Some again have criti-
cised it while perfectly ignoring one of its chief
principles, which, expressed in modern Kantian
phrase, would run : " The transcendental ideality
of the world does not deprive it of its empirical
reality."

Chapter I is more or less introductory, as it is
intended to help indirectly towards a thorough
grasp of the idea of Maya. The philology of the

Tiii PREFACE

word is not within the strict scope of my essay, but
I have collected some suitable materials which may
help to give an insight into the gradual transition
of meaning of the word itself. In Chapter II I
have attempted to trace the development of the
conception, apart from the word. I do not, how-
ever, claim that the internal system of the Upani-
sads as sketched there, the transition of the various
stages of thought, etc., is to be looked upon as an
ultimate scheme or the only possible scheme. But
surely it is one of the possible systematic ways of
treating the Upanisads, consistent and coherent
as far as it goes ; and as yet I know of no better
scheme. In the same chapter I have given a very
brief analysis of Gaudapada's Karikas on the Man-
dukya Upanisad, so far as they bear on the subject.
This has its own justification, since the book is
unfortunately not so well known, and even those
who know it cursorily do not always understand
it correctly. Some of its epigrammatic stanzas
have been erroneously construed so as to counte-
nance either the doctrine of Sunyavada or that of
the reality of the world. I have selected the most
typical as weU as the most difficult passages, which,
I may hope, wiU remove doubts on this point. It
seems to me perfectly clear that Gauclapada was
a thoroughgoing ideahst and a worthy precursor
of Sankara. Then in Chapter III I have examined
in brief the fundamental objections of the three
other schools within the Vedanta, especially those

PREFACE ix

of the Theistic Idealism of Ramanuja. These
objections have never before been collected together
and discussed in reference to the doctrine of Maya
proper. The brevity in this part of the work was
intended in order not to make the essay mineces-
sarily long. I had a mind, however, to append
another chapter on the analogies of the Conception
of Maya in European philosophy, especially in the
systems of Plato, Plotinus, Berkeley, Kant, and
Schopenhauer. But in the present volume I have
left it out, since it was felt that the present essay
is in a way complete in itself, and that the additional
part, which would have taken a considerable length
in itself, is not necessary for the purpose.

I have given my own translation of passages
which in my opinion have not been quite accurately
rendered in the current translations. I have em-
ployed the words " appearance " and " illusion "
rather indiscriminately in translating the word
" maya," though I am conscious of the subtle
difference in the two conceptions. The word illusion
has been most current in this connexion. Person-
ally I would prefer the term appearance. The
world, says the Maya theory in its correct inter-
pretation, is an appearance, not a mere illusion,
since the latter as such is impossible. There are
some passages where the latter conception seems to
be held ; e.g., " mdyamdtram " if rendered as " a
mere illusion " would imply this. But as I have
shown in some detail with reference to passages

X PREFACE

from the Chandogya Upanisad, this was not exactly
what was meant by the old Indian thinkers. I
hold that even if some of them really thought so,
they were mistaken, and their ultra-rationaUstic
temper is to account for that. The Brhada-
ranyaka Upanisad emphatically proclaims that the
Atman is the only reality and that all plurality is
a mere matter of words ; the Chandogya Upanisad,
instead of starting with the Atman, does so with
the world, and comes to the same conclusion from
this standpoint as well, viz., that the world is strictly
speaking the Atman itself, since there is no other
existence but the Atman. These two positions
correspond to Schopenhauer's parallel sayings :
(i) that the word is my " Vorstellung," (2) that
it is my " Wille." As limited by space, time, and
causality it is an appearance, but in its own nature
it is the Atman.

My best thanks are due to Professor Paul Deus-
sen (Kiel), the Rev. Dr. J, Estlin Carpenter, Pro-
fessor A. A. MacdoneU and Professor J. A. Smith
(Oxford), for their various useful suggestions. I am
also grateful to Dr. F. H. Bradley, Dr. H. Rashdall,
Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Rev. L. P. Jacks (Oxford),
Professor Henry Jones (Glasgow) and Professor
Rudolf Eucken (Jena), who were kind enough to
give me opportunities to discuss with them the
subject of Maya in the light of European philosophy
in order to remove some of my difficulties. I have
also to thank Dr. F. W. Thomas, Librarian, India

PREFACE xi

Office, Professor L. D. Bamett, of the British
Museum, and the Librarians of the Bodleian for
their kind assistance with books and unpubhshed
manuscripts. To Professor Bamett I am further
obliged for correcting the proof sheets.

PRABHU DUTT SHASTRI.

Christ Church, Oxford,
January, 1911.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Preface v

CHAPTER I
History of the Word " Maya " , . 1-32

Introductory — BothJingk and Roth on Maya —
Geldner — Uhlenbeck — Grassmann — Monier
Williams — The Nighaijtu and the Nirukta —
Conclusions so far — ^The various forms of the
word arranged in order of their frequency of
occurrence — References to R.V. — Hymns of
R.V. where the word occurs — Meaning of the
word in R.V. — Ludwig, Rosen — Sayapa's
explanations — The idea of " Power as Witt "
distinguished from that of " Physical Power "
— Rare occurrence of the word in Y. V. and S.V.
— Reference to A.V. — The Brahmaijas — The
Upanisads — Gaudapada's Karikas — BSida-
rSyapa's SQtras — ^ankara's BhSsya — Philo-
sophical and Popular meanings — Etymo-
logy — Two-fold Conception of Maya — Inter-
connexion of the various meanings.

CHAPTER II

Development of the Conception of Maya. 33-110

Germs of the Idea in R.V. x. 129, etc. — Search

after Unity — ^The Brahmanas and the Upani-

' sads — Importance of the Brh. Up. — Yajfiaval-

xiii

xiv CONTENTS

PAGE

kya's Idealism — Metaphysical and Empirical
standpoints — Idea of " Accommodation " —
The Upanisads as a system — ^The stages of
Pure Idealism, Pantheism, Cosmogonism,
Theism and Materiahsm, etc. — Quotations
in support — Discussion of the Idea in the
Bhagavadgiti — Gaudapada, and Sankara —
General view of the modem way of interpre-
tation — Recapitulation.

CHAPTER III

Objections to the Doctrine within the

Vedanta 111-138

The four schools of the Vedanta — Their funda-
mental doctrine in relation to Miya — Ra,ma-
nuja's criticism of Maya — Exainination of
his arguments — Their chief fallacy — Stand-
point of Vallabha and Madhva — Other more
important objections to the Theory — Recapi-
tulation — Conclusion.

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA"

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE WORD " MAYA "

" Maya " is one of the most important and prominent
words in the vocabulary of the Vedanta philosophy.
If it had an unalterable and iixed meaning through-
out the history of Indian thought, our task would
have been lighter and we should have been saved the
labour of writing this chapter. But as it is, the
word is very fluid, and has at different times assumed
various shapes of meaning. What it meant in the
Vedic Uterature seems at first sight to be almost
contradictory to its later connotation. Our present
inquiry is intended to bring out the connecting
links between its various meanings as they gradu-
ally passed through stages of transition. To avoid
all subsequent error and confusion in understand-
ing the conception of Maya, it seems necessary to
make clear the ground by first coming to terms
with the word itself. The misconception and mis-
use of words is at the root of a host of fallacies ;
hence, we believe that no mean part of our task is
finished if we are able, by means of a careful philo-
logical research, to define the concept of Maya in

6 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

brings out the same sense of " prajna " while ex-
plaining " adhenva carati mayayaisah " (Nir. i. 6, 4),'
" imam u nu kavitamasya mayam " (Nir. vi. 3,
4), 2 " mayam u tu yajniyanam " (Nir. vii. 7, 5),*
and " visva hi maya avasi svadhavah " (Nir. xii.

2, 6).* We shall have occasion to see presently
how far Sayana sticks to this meaning in his monu-
mental commentary on R.V. Without citing any
more lists of meanings, let us approach directly
the Sanskrit literature — and the Vedas first — in
order to judge the meaning correctly from the usage
in the context.

After a careful examination of all the passages
where the word occurs in any of its forms in the
huge bulk of R.V., we arrive at the following con-
clusions : —

I. As regards frequency of occurrence the form
most commonly met with is mayah^ (nom. and
ace. pi.). It occurs no less than twenty-four times.
Next in order comes may ay a * (instr. sing.), which

p. 134, 1. 8 ; vol. iii., published l836, p. 190, 1. 2 ; p. 427,
1. 10 ; vol. iv., p. 278, 1. 10.

1 Cf. Roth's ed. of Yaska's " Nirukta," Gottingen, 1852 ;
i. 20 (p. 39). R.V. X. 71. 5.

» Cf. Ibid. vi. 13 (p. 95-96). R.V. v. 85. 6.

= Cf. Ibid. vii. 27 (p. 124). R.V. x. S8. 6.

* Cf. Ibid. xii. 17 (p. 174). R.V. vi. 58. i.

5 Cf. R.V. i. 32. 4, 117. 3; ii. II. 10, 27. 16 ; iii. 20.

3, 53. 8 ; V. 2. 9, 31. 7, 40. 6, 40. 8 ; vi. 18. 9, 20. 4,
22. 9, 44. 22, 45. 9, 58. I ; vii. I. 10, 98. 5, 99. 4 ; viii. 41. 8 ;

X. 53- 9. 73- 5. 99- 2, ii^i. 6.

' Cf. R.V. i. 80. 7, 144. I, 160. 3 ; ii. 17. 5 ; iii. 27. 7 ;

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 7

occurs nineteen times ; mdyinah 1 (ace. pi. and gen.
sing, of mayin) occurs fifteen times ; mayabhi^ "
(instr. pi.), thirteen times ; mayinam * (ace. sing
of mdyin), ten times ; the word may a * itself three
times, and each of the forms may am'' (ace.
sing.), mdy% * (nom. sing, of mayin), and
mdyindm'' also occurs three times. Mdyini is
found twice (R.V. v. 48. i ; x. 5. 3), and mdyind
(instr. sing, of mdyin) only once (R.V. vi. 63. 5).
Other forms, including compounds, which occur
once are mdyini (R.V. v. 48. 3), mdydvind (R.V.
X. 24. 4), mdydvdn (R.V. iv. 16. 9), mdydvinam (R.V.
ii. II. 9), and mdydvinah (R.V. x. 83. 3).

2. There are altogether seventy-five hymns in
R.V. in which the word appears in its simple or
compound forms. Out of these thirty-five are ad-
dressed to Indra ; * eight to Agni (R.V. i. 144 ;

iv. 30. 12, 30. 21 ; V. 63. 3, 63. 7 ; vi. 22. 6 ; vii. 104.
24 ; viii. 23. 15, 41. 3 ; ix. 73. 5, 73. 9, 83. 3 ; x. 71. 5 ;
85. 18, 177. I.

1 Cf. R.V. i. 39. 2, 51. 5, 54. 4, 64. 7, 159. 4 ; ii.
II. 10 ; iii. 38. 7, 38. 9, 56. I ; v. 44. II ; vi. 61. 3 ; vii.
82. 3 ; viii. 3. 19, 23. 14 ; x. 138. 3.

* Cf. R.V. i. II. 7, 33. 10, 51. 5, 151. 9; iii. 34. 6,
60. I ; v. 30. 6, 44. 2, 78. 6 ; vi. 47. 18, 63. 5 ; viii. 14. 14 ;
X. 147. 2.

' Cf. R.V. i. II. 7, 53. 7, 56. 3, 80. 7 ; ii. II. 5 ; v. 30.
6, 58. 2 ; vi. 48. 14 ; viii. 76. I ; x. I47. 2.

• Cf. R.V. iii. 61. 7 ; v. 63. 4 ; x. 54. 2.
» Cf. R.V. v. 85. 5, 85. 6 ; X. 88. 6.

° Cf. R.V. vii. 28. 4 ; X. 99. 10, 147. 5.

' Cf. R.V. i. 32. 4 ; iii. 20. 3, 34. 3.

» Vide R.V. i. 11, 32, 33, 51, 53, 54, 56, 80, I44, 160 ;

8 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

iii. 20, 27 ; V. 2 ; vii. i ; viii. 23 ; x. 5, 53) ; four
to the Asvins (R.V. i. 117 ; v. 78 ; vi. 63 ; x. 24)
as well as to the Maruts (R.V. i. 39, 64 ; v. 58 ;
vi. 48) ; three to Visve-devah (R.V. iii. 56 ; v. 44,
48) ; two each to Varuna (R.V. v. 85 ; viii. 41),
Soma (R.V. ix. 73, 83), Mitravarunau (R.V. i. 151 ;
V. 63), and Dyava-prthivyau (R.V. i. 100, 159) ; and
one each to Usas (R.V. iii. 61), Sarasvati (R.V. vi.
61), the Adityas (R.V. ii. 27), Pusan (R.V. vi. 58),
Atri (R.V. V. 40), Jiianam (R.V. x. 71), the Rbhus
(R.V. iii. 60), Indravarunau (R.V. vii. 82), Somarkau
(R.V. x. 85), Mayabheda (R.V. x. 177), Indravisnu
(R.V. rii. 99) ; Prajapati-Vaisvamitra (R.V. iii.
38), and Surya-vaisvanarau (R.V. x. 88).

3. The word " Maya " is not employed in one and
the same sense throughout R.V. The Indian tra-
dition itself bears ample testimony to this fact.
As a rule, following Yaska, Sayana in most cases
gives the meaning prajnd — i.e., energy, mental
power as distinguished from physical — but he is
not always definite ; in fact, he could not be so.
It would be a gratuitous assumption on our part
to expect the same word to be used in one and the
same rigid sense by so many different Rsis, who
were by no means all contemporary. Tradition —
as preserved in Sayana's commentary — ^teUs us

ii. II, 17 ; iii. 34, 53 ; iv. 16, 30 ; v. 30, 31 ; vi. 18, 20, 22,
44. 45. 47 ; vii. 28, 98, 104 ; viii. 3, 14, 76 ; x. 73, 99, iii.
138, 147-

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 9

that the two meanings prajnd and kapata ^ are the
most common, and sometimes run parallel. For
instance, even in the very first hymn (R.V. i. 11. 7),
in which the word appears as mdydbhih (and mdyi-
nam), Sayana seems to waver between these two
meanings, and leaves the reader to make his own
choice. He explains mdydbhih by kapatavisesaih
(lit. " by special stratagems, artifices ") but adds
at the same time that it may also mean " praj-
fiabhih " (" by wondrous powers," Griffith). Wilson
adopts the first meaning, " by stratagems," Lud-
wig^ translates it as " durch iibernatiirliche Kraft."
Rosen* also renders it as " praestigiis." But these
are not the only meanings accepted by tradition.
In R.V. iii. 27. 7 Sayana explains " mdyayd "
by karmavisaydhhijndnena," * i.e., " by knowledge
of sacred rites." This meaning appears to us to
be rather far-fetched. In R.V. iii. 60. i he renders
the same word as karmahhih? In iii. 6i-. 7, mdyd
is translated as " power," " glory " — " prabha-
rupa," lit. in the form of effulgence or light. In R.V.

1 Which mean artifice, deception, cunning. Germ. List,
Betrug, Kunst, Kraft, etc.

2 Ludwig, Der Rigveda. Prag, 1878.

' Fridericus Rosen, Rigveda-Samhitd, Liber Primus,
Sanskrits et Latind, London, 1838.

* Sayana derives this meaning thus : mimite janite
karma miyate anayeti va maya karmavisayajnanam (root
ma, to know), 3rd conj. mimite, or ma, to measure, miyate.

6 Sayana adds : miyante jnayanta' iti may ah karmani.
Cf. also R.V. X. 53. 9, where Sayana says : " Karmana-
maitat."

10 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

iv. 30. 21, and v. 30. 6, Sayana emphatically gives
the meaning sakti (power).

Again, keeping aside for a moment Mandalas i. and
X. of R.V. — which are now supposed on good evidence
to have been subsequently added to the original
collection — we find the same want of fixity of the
meaning conveyed by the term in the other books of
R.V. For instance, according to Sayana's tradition
the word is used in the sense of " deception " in R.V.
ii. II. 10, iii. 34. 6, iv. 16. 9, vi. 20. 4, vii. 104. 24,
and so forth, while both the meanings " power "
and " deception " are taken in v. 30. 6 simultaneously.
In V. 31. 7 the word is taken to mean " a young
woman." This meaning too has its own justifica-
tion and is not unconnected with the other two
meanings. In what sense a woman can be called
mdyd is not to be discussed here, but will find its
appropriate place in the sequel.

The two chief meanings, therefore, which the
word is assigned in R.V. are " power " (Prajna, lit.
" knowledge ") and " deception " (" Kapata,' Vanr
cana). The above examination of the various pas-
sages in which the word occurs has shown us that
wherever it means " power " the idea of " mystery "
necessarily goes with it ; i.e., it does not mean any
" physical " power, but " a mysterious power of the
will," which we would translate into such Sanskrit
expressions as sankalpa-sakti or icchd-&akti. In
R.V. iii. 53. 8, for instance, Indra is spoken of as
" assuming many different forms," and it is not

HISTORY OF THE WORD " MAYA " ii

done by his " physical " power but simply by his
wonderful and extraordinary " will-power " (aneka-
rtipagrahanasamarthya). He wills that he may
assume such and such forms and it is realized ;
hence Indra is very frequently termed mayin in
the Vedic hymns. Certain mysterious things or
results are produced by this mysterious will-power,
and these results being extra-oidLmBxy by their very
nature may be said to set at naught the ordinary
human understanding, which because of its inherent
limitations is apt to be " deceived " by such pheno-
mena. Hence, the idea of " mystery " being com-
mon to both these meanings, it is quite easy to
understand the transition from the idea of " mys-
terious will-power " to that of " deception." In
fact the two ideas interpenetrate each other, so
much so that it seems to us rather a forced distinc-
tion to make when we speak of the transition. Still,
distinctions are to be made, especially when they
help us to a clearer understanding of that which is
really beyond them.

We may, however, note here in passing that
where Indra is spoken of as assuming various forms
(cf. especially iii. 53. 8 and vi. 47. 18) it appears
that the singers of the hymns — and Indians of the
Vedic age in general — were not unaware of a dis-
tinction between the one and the many, of the
possibility of the one becoming the many and of
the latter being a deceptive creation of a mysterious
power.

12 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

This inference seems to us to be reasonable and
valid. The fact is very important, as we shall have
the opportunity to speak more of it later. Here
we cannot do anything more than simply mention
it, since we are now concerned only with the mean-
ings of the word so far as it can be determined by
a collocation of ancient texts in a more or less
chronological order.

Now, the word does not so often occur in the
Yajurveda and the Samaveda. This cannot sur-
prise us in any way. These two Vedas contain
mostly the mantras of the Rgveda — ^which are
adapted and arranged to suit their particular func-
tions — as well as some new mantras. In the Y.V.
all ideas are subservient to sacrifice (yajna) and its
various elaborate ceremonies ; while in the S.V.
chanting or singing the mantras is the chief function.

The R.V. is the chief source of these two Vedas,
which along with it form what is known as " tra3a
vidya," i.e., triple knowledge. The comparative
absence of the word Maya from the Y.V. and the
S.V. does not affect our examination, as the R.V.
can be safely taken to be an index to the ideas and
views of the ancient Indians of that age. It was
not very long before these two Vedas sprang into
existence, to be ranked with the R.V. as to their
importance and authority in the tradition of the
Aryans. In fact these three Vedas seem to have
been brought into existence almost simultaneously,
though it must be admitted that it took a consider-

HISTORY OF THE WORD " MAYA " 13

ably long interval of time to give them the shape
in which they are found at present, i.e., as a complete
set of books.

The Atharva-Veda was added to the trayi-vidya
much later. The fact has been amply proved by
a critical examination of both external and internal
evidence. It is not for us to enter into the question
here. The A.V. represents a different state of
civilization of society from that described in the
R.V. And we are satisfied to note that the word
Maya is not missing in it. Altogether the word
occurs in ten books only, in sixteen h3mins ^ and
twenty times in aU (in A.V. viii. 9. 5 and viii. 10. 22
the word occurring twice in each of the hjanns and
twice also in xiii. 2 and xix. 27).

The form may a occurs only once (A.V. viii. 9. 5).
The instrumental singular, mayayd, occurs most
frequently, viz., eight times. ^ MdyinaJj ^ occurs
three times and may dm * and may ah ^ twice each.
Other forms which occur only once are mdye (viii.
10. 22), mdydydh (viii. 9. 5), mdyabhih (xii. i. 8)
and mdy% (v. 11. 4).

1 A.V. ii. 29. 6 ; iv. 23. 5, 38. 3 ; v. II. 4 ; vi. 72. I ;
vii. 81. 1 ; viii. 3. 24, 4. 24, 9. 5, 10. 22 ; x. 8. 34 ; xii. i. 8.
xiii. 2. 3, 2. II ; xix. 27. 5, 27. 6, 65. i, 68. i.
Cf. Whitney's Index Verhorum to the Published Text of
the Atharva-Veda, New-Haven, JAOS. vol. xii. p. 225.

" A.V. iv. 38. 3 ; vi. 72. I ; vii. 81. i ; viii. 4. 24 ; x.
8. 34 ; xiii. 2. 3, 2. 11 ; xix. 68. i.

' A.V. xix. 27. 5, 27. 6, 66.1.

♦ A.V. ii. 29. 6 ; viii. 10. 22.

» A.V. iv. 23. 5 ; viii. 3. 24.

14 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

From the very nature of the contents of the
Atharva-Veda it is easy to judge the meaning of the
word mayd as used in it. Here the mysterious or
magical element of the " power " spoken of in the
Rgveda is more emphasized, and there hardly seems
any scope for doubting the meaning. It means
" magic " throughout, and is even translated as
" illusion " (the great controversial word in our
subject) by Whitney .^ The two passages in which
it is rendered so are found in the well-known " Mys-
tic " hymn, extolling the Viraj, e.g., in A.V., lo. 22,
"The Asuras called to her, O lUusion* (maya),
come ! " It may also be stated, by the way, that
A.V. vii. 81. I, viii. 3. 24, viii. 4. 24 are taken from
R.V. X. 85. 18, V. 2. 9, vii. 10. 4 respectively.

Now we have seen so far that mdyd in R.V. means
" a wondrous or supernatural power," " an extra-
ordinary skill," and that the " supernatural " ele-
ment is more strongly emphasized in A.V., where
it means " magic " and hence " illusion."

With regard to the word occurring in the Brah-
manas it would be useless for us to enter into any

* Cf. Atharva-Veda Samhita, trans, by W. D. Whitney
(Harvard Oriental Series), 1905, vol. ii. p. 507, 514. For
translation see also Les Livres viii, et ix. de L'At-
harva Vida Traduits et Commentis, pax Victor Henry, Paris,
1894 ; and Griffith's The Hymns of the Atharva-Veda, and
Ludwig's' Der Rigveda, Band iii., Einleitung, Prag,
1878, p. 493.

> We would rather say " mystery " instead of Whitney's
use of the word " illusion " here.

' HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 15

details here. The really philosophical treatises,
which are of fundamental importance for our pur-
pose, are the final portions of the Brahmanas, called
the Upanisads. But before we take up the Upani-
sads proper, we may quote a few references from
the Brahmanas too in the way of Sthdli-pulaka-
nyaya.^

The Vajasaneyi-Samhita '^ contains the forms
maya (xi. 69), mayam,' mayaya * and mayayam,"
and Mahidhara in his commentary gives the words
" prajna " and " buddhi " as synonsmis of " maya."
The Aitareya Brahmana* has mayaya (vi. 36),
mayam, mayavant, and mayavattarah (viii. 23),
where the word clearly means " supernatural or
magical skill." The form " mayaya " also occurs
in the Taittiriya Brahmana' (iii. 10. 8. 2) where,

1 i.e., the maxim of " the cooking-pot and the boiling
rice." By finding one grain well-cooked we infer the same
with regard to all the others. So the conditions of the class
may be inferred from that of a part, if the whole is made up
of homogeneous and similar parts. Cf. Patanj all's Maha-
bhasya, i. 4. 23 (Vart. 15). " Paryapto hi ekah pulakah
sthalya nidarsanaya."

* Weber, The White Yajurveda, part I, The Vajasaneyi-
Samhita, in the Madhyandina and the Kanva-Sakha, with
the commentary of Mahidhara. Berlin and London, 1852.

' Ibid., p. 420. V.S. xiii. 44. Mahidhara adds, " miyate
jn&yate anaya iti maya."

* Ibid., p. 728, V.S. xxiii. 52.
6 Ibid., p. 841, V.S. XXX. 7.

" Das Aitareya Brahmana, herausgegeben von Theodor
Aufrecht, Bonn, 1879. See p. 184 and 230.

' The Taittiriya Brahmana of the Black Yajurveda,

i6 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

as Sayana also adds, it means " by divine power."
Further the Satapatha-Brahmana ^ too contains
the forms " mayam (ii. 4. 25), and " maye " (iii.
2. 4. i), mayavant (xiii. 5. 4. 12) where the word
means " supernatural power." ^ The Paiica-
vimiati Brahmana also has the word mayaya (xiii.
6. 9) in the same sense. Mayavant (as an adj.)
is seen in Ait. Br. viii. 23, and in Sat. Br. xiii. 5. 4.
12. These typical examples are more than suffi-
cient for our purpose, and we now hasten to quote
references from the Upanisads and from the Bhaga-
vadgita, which may be termed the final Upanisad or
the kernel of all the Upanisads.*

The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, the oldest as well
as the most important in many ways, contains the
word " mayabhih " (ii. 5. 19),* the Praina Up.

with the Commentary of Sayana, ed. by Rajendra Lala
Mitra, Calcutta, 1859, vol. iii. p. 237.

1 The Satapatha Brahmana of the White Yajurveda, with
Sayana'sCom., ed. byAcarya Satyavrata Samasrami ; vol.
ii., Kanda II, Calcutta, 1906, p. 191, and vol. iii, Kandalll,
Calcutta, 1905, p. 119 (Bibl. Ind.).

2 Sayana translates maya here as " Aghatita-ghatana-
saktih," and in the next passage expresses the same idea
by " paramavyamohakarini saktih." These synonyms
give a clear explanation.

' See G. A. Jacob, Concordance to the Principal Upanisads
and Bhagavadgtta.

* This is the famous quotation from R.V. vi. 47. 18,
which also occurs in Sat. Br. xiv. 5. 5. 19 ; also in Jaim-
iniya-Upanisad Br. i. 44. 1. See Brhadaranyahopanisad,
herausgegeben und iibersetzt von O. Bohtlingk, St. Peters-
burg, 1889, p. 22.

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 17

maya (i. 16),^ the Svetasvatara Up. maya (i. 10) ,*
mayam, mayinam (iv. 10), ^ map,* and mayaya
(iv. 9).

Among the later Upanisads too the word occurs ;
the forms maya, mayam, mayaya in Nrp. Up. (iii.
I ; V. i) ^ and in Nrut. Up. (Khanda 9),^ mayama-
tram in Njut. Up. (i and 5). * In Cul. Up. (3) *
we read —

1 Bibl. Indie, vol. viii. No. 29. Here Maya is spoken of
as a defect along with jihmam (moral crookedness) and
anrtam (telling a lie). It is itself mithyacarariipadosa
(the defect of hypocrisy).

2 Here maya means the great cosmic illusion. In his
com. on the passage Sankara adds, " sukhaduhkha-
mohatmakaSesaprapancarupamaya," i.e., the whole world
as a sum-total of pleasure, pain, delusion, etc.

' Here the Prakyti of the Sankhya is spoken of as maya.
Cf . " mayam tu prakf tim viddhi mayinam tu mahes^varam."

* The Great Lord is called mdyl here and in the follow-
ing stanza. He is said to create the universe only by his
maya-Sakti.

" " The Nfsimha-Tapani Upanisad," Bibl. Indica, Cal.,
1871. As these and other minor Upanisads are not easily
available we give the following quotations in full : " Maya
va esa narasimhi," " natmanara maya sprSati," " Kse-
tram ksetram va mayaisa sampadyate," " maya ca tamo-
riipanubhiiteh," " evam evaisa maya," " maya cavidya
ca svayam eva bhavati," " mayam etam Saktim vidyat,"
" ya etani mayam ^aktim veda," " mayaya va etat sarvam
vestitam," "mayaya vahirvestitam," "mayaya hy an-
yad iva, " " miidha iva vy avaharann aste mayay aiva, " " may-
aya nasamvittihsvaprakaSe," " trayam apy etat (and tray-
am atrapi) susuptam svapnam mayamatram," (Nfut i),
" idam sarvam yad ayam atma mayamatram " (Nfut. 5).

• For Ciilika and other Upanisads see the Collection of

i8 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

" Vikarajananim mayam astarupam ajam dhruvam,"
where Maya is spoken of as bringing about the exist-
ence of the phenomenal world.

The Sarv. Up.^ reads —

" Katham pratyagatma paramatma atma may a ceti," ^

where an inquiry is made into the meanings of these
four terms including maya, and the answer is given
in section 4 : —

" Anadir antarvatni pramanapramanasadharana na sati
nasati na sadasati svayam avikarad vikaralietau nirn-
pyamane asati, anirupyamane sati laksanasunya sa
mayety ucyate,"

where the mysterious nature of maya is described.
The Ramap. Up.,* which is one of the sectarian
Upanisads, speaking of Rama and Sita as Prakrti
and Purusa, reads thus —

" tato Ramo manavo mayayadhyat " (17).
" konaparsve ramamaye" (61).

thirty-two Upanisads, published |by the Anandasrama
Sanskrit Series, No. 29, Poona, 1895. The Ciil. Up. con-
tains only twenty-one slokas, divided into two khandas,
and belongs to A.V., p. 230.

'^ The Sarvopanisatsdra is a small prose-treatise contain-
ing only five sections, in the last of which it gives a good
description of maya. See Ibid., p. 587-92.

2 The Great Lord is called mayi here and in the follow-
ing stanza. He is said to create the universe only by his
maya-sakti.

' The Ramapflrvatapanlya Up. contains ninety-four
slokas divided into tea khandas. See ibid., pp. 487-529.

HISTORY OF THE WORD " MAYA " IQ

" mayavidye ye kalaparatattve " (89).
" namo mayamayaya ca" (30).

The Gopicandana Up. reads —

" mayasahitabrahmasambhogavasat " (4).
" mSyasabalitam Brahmasit " (Ibid.).

The Krsna Up. also reads —

" may a sa trividha prokta (5).

" maya tredha hy udahrta " (6).

" ajayya Vaisnavi maya" (7).

" Harih saksan mayavigrahadharanah " (11).

"Mayaya mohitam jagat " (12).

" tasya maya jagat katham " (13).

In all these passages mdyd means " appearance,"
" illusion," ^ etc. The same sense is further found
in " sa evam mayaparimohitatma " (Kaivalya
Up. 12), and " indrajalam iva mayamayam " (Maitri
Up. iv. 2).

One of the most brilliant and important works on
Advaitism is Gaudapada's Karikas on the Mandukya
Upanisad.2 These are divided into four parts
(prakaranas) : (i) Agama ; (2) Vaitathya ; (3)
Advaita ; (4) Alata-santi, each of which is regarded
as a separate Upanisad. Of the subject-matter
of this important work we shall have occasion to
speak in Chapter II. But here we may only point

1 We are consciously using these two words as synonyms
here.

"i The Mandukya-Upanisad (of A.V.) with Gaudapada's
Karikas, together with Sankara's Comm., Anandairama
Series, No. 10, 1890, Poona.

20 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

out that the word " maya " is here also used in the
same sense of " appearance," " illusion." (In one
passage, however, it means " supernatural power,"
ii. 12.)

The Karika contains sixteen passages altogether
in which the word waya occurs. Out of these, Part
III contributes no less than six passages. Part IV
contributing four, and each of the other two parts
contributing three,

" svapnamayasarupeti srstir anyair vikalpita,"

where the world is likened to a world of dreams and
to illusion, both of which are false.

" anadimayaya supto yada jivah prabudhyate " (i. i6),

where the cosmic illusion — under the influence of
which the individual feels as if " asleep " — is spoken
of as beginningless.

" Mayamatram idam dvaitam advaitam paramarthatah "

(i- 17),

where the duahty, i.e., the multiplicity of which the
word is composed, is declared mere illusion.

" Kalpayaty atmanatmanam atma devah svamayaya "
(ii. 12),

where mdyd is said to be the Lord's own " wondrous
power." Here the sense of such a supernatural
power is maintained. But, as wiU be shown pre-
sently, the two ideas are closely allied to each

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 21

other. The sense of " illusion " is a natural
development of the idea of such a " power."

" mayaisa tasya devasya yaya sammohitah svayam "
(ii. 19),

where maya is spoken of as the Lord's great illusion.

"svapnamaye yatha dyste gandharvanagaram yatha"
(ii. 31).

where again mdyd is collated with svapna, and it
is said that the waking world has no substantiahty,
like a dreaming world or like a " fata morgana."

" samghatah svapnavat sarve atmamayavisarjitah " (iii. 10),

where the so-called objective existences in this world
are declared false and mere creations of the At-
man's mdyd (avidyd).

" may ay a bhidyate hy etan nanyathajam kathamcana"
(iii. 19),

where the differences or the plurality are said to
be due to mere illusion. The same thought is
repeated in

" neha naneti camnayad indro mayabhir ity api
ajayamano bahudha mayaya jayate tu sah" (iii. 24).

Further, in the following two passages it is dis-
cussed how the world is created not from not-being
but from being — ^not " in reality " but " as it were " : —

" sato hi mayaya janma yujyate na tu tattvatah " (iii. 27).
" asato mayaya janma tattvato naiva yujyate " (iii. 28).

In Part IV we find —

22 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

" Upalambhat samacaran mayahasti yathocyate " (iv. 44),

where the empirical existence of the world is granted
like the one granted to an illusive elephant.

"janma mayopamam tesam sa ca maya na vidyate"
(iii. 58),

where " maya " is said to have no real existence at
all.

' ' yatha may amay ad vij aj j ayate tanmayo 'nkurah " (iv. 5 9) ,

where the creation, destruction, etc., of the worldly
objects is described as mdyd, an appearance, seeming
true only in the realm of appearance.

" yatha svapne dvayabhasam cittam calati mayaya,
tatha jagrad dvayabhasam cittam calati mayaya " (iv. 5i),

where the seeming duality is spoken of as mere
vijndnamaya, and the waking and the dreaming
states are compared in this regard.

The same sense is observed in the great epic, the
Mahabharata. For instance —

" pura vikurute mayam " (i. 6,029).

Ce. also i. 7,631, iii. 2,557, xiii. 7,595,
" mayam mohinim samupasritah " (i. 1,156),
" apsara devakanya va maya" (iii. 15,580).

Now we come to the Bhagavadglta, which is the
finest gem in our New Testament of the Upanisads,
and which contains the essentials of all our philo-
sophy.

HISTORY OF THE WORD " MAYA " 23

" prakrtim svam adhisthaya
sambhavamy atmamayaya " (iv. 6).

Here it means " will-power."

" Daivi hy esa gunamayi
mama maya duratyaya,
mam eva ye prapadyante
mdydm etam taranti te " (vii. 14).

Here it means " illusion," which being dependent
on God is spoken of as "divine."

" mdyaydpahxtajnasia,
asuram^ bhavam asritah " (vii. 15).

Here, too, the same sense of " illusion."

" bhramayan sarvabhutani
yantrarudhani mdydyd" (xviii. 61).

Here, too, it means the great " illusive Power."
Now let us turn to the System of the Vedanta,
properly so called as one of the six systems or schools
of Indian philosophy. The Sutras (aphorisms,
condensed formulas) which constitute this system
are called the Brahma-Sutras or the Veddnta-?>utras,
and are 555 in number. The word mdya, however,
occurs only in one of these (iii. 2. 3), which runs
thus —

" Mayamatram tu kartsnyena anabhivyaktasvarupatvat "1

where, speaking of the nature of a dream, the dream-
world is pronounced to be mere " illusion." Max

1 Cf. Deussen, Die Sutras des Vedanta, Leipzig, 1887,
p. 504 ; Thibaut, Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (vol. xxxviii. of
S.B.E.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1896, p. 134.

24 THE DOCTRINE OF MAyA

Miiller^ seems to be incorrect when he says that
the word " need not mean more than a dream.'' In
that case the sutra would mean that the dream-
world is a dream, which hardly has any sense.
Doubtless the word means " illusion " here, as it
is quite in keeping with the spirit of the preceding
two Sutras, which also bear on the same subject of
the unreality of the dream-world.

The most important, authoritative and popular,
as well as the oldest, commentary on the Vedanta-
Sutras is the one by Sankara (otherwise called
Sankaracarya) called the " Sariraka-Bhasya." This
Bhasya has so much been respected that it forms a
part and parcel of the technical system of the
Vedanta together with the Siitras. Of the intrinsic
merit of Sankara's commentary or of its relation to
the Brahma-Sutras we shall have occasion to speak
later on. Suffice it to say here that the term " maya "
is foimd in the commentary fifteen times in the
following passages,* and it invariably has the sense
of " illusion."

I. " yatha mdydvinas carma-khadgadharat sutrena
akasam adhirohatah sa eva mdydvi paramartharupo
bhumistho 'nyah"^ (On i. i. 17.)

1 Max Miiller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy,
Longmans, 1899, p. 243.

2 We have selected here the more typical and important
passages. No doubt there are some others too, some of
these having been quoted in ch. ii.

* Sankara's Comm. on 1. i. 17. p. 120, 1. 16 of the
Vedanta-Sutras, Bibl. Ind., Cal., 1863.

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 25

Here the word " mayavin " occurs and means a
" juggler " ; so too it means in the following —

2. " eka eva paramesvarah kutastha-nityo vijnanadhatur

avidyaya m&yaya mayavivad anekadha vibhavyate." ^
(On i. 3. 19).

3. "mayamayi maha-susuptih." (On i. 4. 3.)''

4. " Kvacin maya iti sucitam." (Ibid.) '

5. " Avyakta hi sa maya." (Ibid.)*

6. " MSyavi iva mayayah prasaritasya jagatah." (On

ii. I. i.)8

7. " yatha svayam prasaritaya mayaya mayavi trisv api

kalesunasamsprsyateavastutvat, evam paramatmapi
samsara-mayaya na samspTsyate iti," etc. (On ii.
I. 9)-*

8. " mayamatram hi etat." (Ibid.) '

g. " yatha ca mayavi svayam-prasaritam mayam icchaya
anayasena eva upasamharati." (On ii. 1.21.) 8

10. " loke 'pi devadisu mayavi-adisu ca svarupa-anumar-
dena eva vicitra hasti-asva-adi sfstayo d^syante."
(On ii. I. 28) .9

These are the ten passages in Sankara's Bhasya
in which the word occiurs. It is possible to discover
more passages in the same on a minuter analysis of
the vast and voluminous commentary, but that
would not affect our problem in any way. It is

1 Sankara on 1. 3. 19. Ibid., p. 269, II. 1-3.

« Ibid., p. 342, 1. 9. * Ibid., p. 342, I. 12.

* Ibid., p. 343, I. I.

8 Sankara on i. 3. 19. Ibid., p. 406, I. 6.

6 Ibid., p. 432, II. 8-10. ' Ibid., p. 432, I. 13.

8 Ibid., p. 472. 1. 9- ' Ibid., p. 484. I- "■

26 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

true beyond doubt that Sankara means by maya
nothing but " illusion."

From Sankara's time downward the phraseology
of the Vedanta was more and more settled technic-
ally, and even modern writers on the Vedanta use
the word " maya " in the same sense of " illusion "
which was so clearly brought out by Sankara.
After his time there has not been any desire to
change the meaning of the term by a different usage.
Hence it will hardly be of much use to examine the
later Sanskrit texts on the Vedanta in order to find
out the word " maya." In the first place, it is
exceedingly difficult to do so, since the later litera-
ture is so varied, vast and undefined in extent ;
secondly, the later Vedanta is in many cases mixed
with the ideas of the Saiikhya, Buddhism, etc. ; and
thirdly, even if we were to succeed in collecting all
the more important modern works on pure Vedanta
and were to coUate the passages containing " maya "
in a similar way, it would scarcely be of any profit,
since, as we have already said, the modern usage of
the term is in no way different from that of Sankara.
A glance through such works as the Pancadail,
the Veddntasdra, the Veddntapanb%dsd, the Atma-
bodha, the Vivekacuddmani, etc., will amply endorse
this fact. We may, therefore, safely close our sur-
vey of the meanings of the term when we have come
down to Sankara's time.

Apart from its philosophic use, the word " maya "
is used in modern classical Sanskrit to convey some

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 27

other ideas also. Sometimes it means " a female
juggler." 1 Again it means "deception" or fraud
(kapata) or hypocrisy (chadma), e.g., in the Maha-
bharata.

"sevetam amayaya gurum " (xiii. 7,595).

i.e.,-'" let both of them serve the teacher without
any deception."

It also means " illusion " in an " unphilosophi-
cal " sense, i.e., in an ordinary way free from the
technical shade of the philosophical idea. For
example, in the Raghuvamsa we read —

"mayam mayodbhavya parikslto 'si" (ii. 62),

i.e., you have been tested by me creating "illusion."
The word is also used sometimes as a proper name.
Buddha's mother was called " maya " (full name :
" maya Devi "), as " mayadevisuta " is one of
Buddha's names mentioned in the " Amarakosa." =

1 Cf. Amarakosa {Dictionary of the Sanskrit Language, by
Amara Simha), edited with an English interpretation and
annotations by H. T. Colebrooke, Serampur, 1808, p. 241,
Sloka II : " syan maya sambari mayakaras tu pratiha-
rikah."

^ Amarakosa, ed. Colebrooke, Ibid. p. 3, Sloka 10 :
" Gautamas ca-arkabandhus ca raayadevisutas ca sah." Cf .
also Max MuUer's Sip{ Systems of Indian Philosophy, Long-
mans, Green & Co., 1899, p. 122. See also "maya" in
Wilson's Dictionary in Sanskrit and English, second enlarged
edition, Calcutta, 1832, p. 657 ; also Sanskrit Dictionary,
by Taranatha Tarkavacaspati, Calcutta, 1882 ; Padmacan-
drakosa, by Prof. Ganesh Datta Shastri, Nirnaya-sagara

28 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

Even at the present day in India some girls are
actually named " Maya-Devi " or " Maya-vati "
or " Maya-Kaur." The chief reason why they are
so named is that they are looked upon as auspicious
if their name means "wealth" or " a bringer of
wealth," etc., ever5rthing bearing on wealth being
supposed to be auspicious. In India almost all
names mean something definite — most of them are
after the designations of some gods or goddesses.
It is supposed that if a girl is named " maya " she
will ever be abounding in riches. This idea of
" riches " leads us to the next meaning of the word,
which is the goddess of wealth, called " Laksmi."
Laksmi is the presiding deity of wealth, and her
presence is always desired by the Hindus.^ It
also means sometimes mere " wealth." This is
especially noticed in modern works in Hindi and
Punjabi.
In the Sankhya system Maya is identified with

Press, Bombay ; further see F. Bopp, Glossarium Sanson-
turn, Berolini, 1847, p. 263 ; Macdonell, Sanskrit English
Dictionary, Lond., 1893, P- 226 ; Theodore Benfrey, A
Sanskrit English Dictionary, Lond., 1866, p. 701, etc., etc.
1 Every year in the month of Asvina there is a special
festival observed called the Dipamala (lit. a row of lamps),
as on that day every Hindu burns a number of lamps (gener-
ally of clay) arranged in long rows in all parts of his house,
especially on the outside. A special traditional story of
Laksmi is recited, and it is hoped that the goddess of
wealth will come to all those who love light (prakasa) and
not darkness.

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 29

Prakrti (the primordial " matter") as the source of
the universe, with the distinct difference that the
latter is real. It is the equilibrium of the three
qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.'^ It is also
called Pradhdna. It has a real and independent
existence and brings about the evolution of the
whole world in company with the Purusa. In other
words, the Sankhya system is based on an out-and-
out dualism. This dualism is questioned and finally
solved by the Vedanta in so far as the Prakrti is
transformed into Maya, and the Purusa into Brah-
man, and so the mutual opposition of the two is
destroyed.

The word " Maya " is derived from ^/raa., to
measure — " miyate anaya iti," i.e., by which is
measured, meaning thereby, as tradition has it, that
illusive projection of the world by which the
immeasurable Brahman appears as if measured.
The same root gives further the sense of " to build,''
leading to the idea of " appearance " or illusion.
Sayana," in his commentary on R.V. i. 11. 7, too
derives the word from " mad mane " (i.e., -v/ma, to
measure). Further on, while explaining the form
" mayaya " in R.V. iii. 27. 7 he derives it from ^/md,
to know, or to measure, and adds — " mimite jaiute
karma miyate anayeti va maya karmavisayabhij-
nanam," i.e.. (i) •v/Ma,toknow — by which the ritual,

I " Sattva-rajas-tamasam samyavastha prakrtih."
' For the derivations proposed by Sayana see also above,
p. 8.

30 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

etc., are known, (2) ^Ma, to measure — ^by which the
ritual, etc., are measured (i.e., understood, or per-
formed) ; hence maya = the knowledge of the object
of the ritual, etc.

Again in R.V. iii. 60. i also, adds Sayana, " miyante
jMyante iti mayah karmani," i.e. " mayah " (nom.
pi.) means ritual practices because they " are known "
(from y'ma, to know). In R.V. x. 53.9 too Sayana
takes the word to mean " karma." We are inchned
to say that this derivation of ' Sayana is a little
far-fetched. Another rather fanciful derivation —
giving the meaning correctly none the less — is
" maya = ma ya, i.e., that which is not — that
which truly is not but stiU appears to be." This is,
however, a merely interesting derivation without
any principles of etymology.

Another way to derive it would be " mati (svat-
manam) darsayati iti maya," i.e., " that which shows
itself — that which appears to our view (without
having any real existence)." This will be from
1^/ma, to show.

Hence, the conception of maya as the causal will-
power (iccha-sakti or prajfia) may be derived from
y'ma, to know ; and, as the effectual state of the
world as illusion, from -v/ma. to measure, to build,
etc.

To sum up : we have seen that the word " maya "
meant in R.V. —

(i) Supernatural power, mysterious will-power,
wonderful skill, and that the idea of the

HISTORY OF THE WORD "MAYA" 31

underlying mystery being more emphasized
later on, it came to mean in A.V.

(2) Magic, illusion. And, further, we saw that

in the Brahmanas and the Upanisads also
it meant

(3) illusion, and that this meaning was more

and more fixed subsequently, till in the
time of Sankara it was established beyond
doubt. The sense of " illusion " may easily
be found to exist in form even in the Vedic
usage of the term, e.g., where in the R.V.
it meant " power or skill " it always meant
"supernatural" or "wondrous" power and
not the ordinary physical power.
The idea of mystery or " wonder " always was
present, and it is this very element that in its devel-
oped form gives the sense of " illusion " or " appear-
ance." The idea of " magic " in A.V. formed a
link between the old meaning of " supernatural
power " and the modern one of " appearance " or
" illusion." As we have, already pointed out,
" maya " has been viewed principally from two
aspects —

(i) As the principle of creation — maya as a
cause — corresponding to the sense of sakti
(wondrous power), or
(2) As the phenomenal creation itself — ^maya
as an effect — corresponding to the sense of
" illusion," " appearance," etc.
This short summary, we hope, will suffice as an

32 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

introduction to the conception of maya in the follow-
ing chapter. The meaning of the term having been
discussed, we will now attempt to trace the develop-
ment of the theory or the idea of Maya from the
Vedic times down to Sankara's, when its usage was
finally settled, limiting ourselves to the system of
the Vedanta proper.

If we were to attempt to trace the conception of
Maya or its alternative conceptions in other systems,
it would lead us out of our present scope. We hope,
however, to be able sometime in the near future to
write a separate treatise on this doctrine with special
reference to its place in modem Hindu philosophy
and its analogies in other Eastern and Western Reli-
gions and Philosophies. For the present we have
to confine ourselves mainly to the historical view of
the conception of Maya within the system of the
Vedanta.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONCEPTION OF MAYA

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF MAYA.

After a brief philological survey of the word maya,
we now turn to the idea itself. The word and the
idea are not to be confused ; since such a confusion
is productive of various false assumptions as to the
doctrine of maya in relation to its place in Indian
thought. There are not a few who boldly allege
that the doctrine is distinctively of a late origin and
growth, an after-thought or a subsequent sugges-
tion of some of the later Vedantins of the purely
Idealistic temperament. The idea of Maya, they
pretend, is wholly wanting in the earlier philoso-
phical treatises of the Hindus, viz., the Upanisads,
etc. Without anticipating any discussion on this
point, we may only state that such thinkers seem to
us to be entirely mistaken. Hence our main thesis
in this chapter wiU be to show, with the aid of suit-
able authoritative quotations from our philosophic
Uterature, that the idea of Maya is very old —
certainly older than the word maya. The word in
its usual sense, of course, occurs for the first time in

36

36 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the Svetasvatara Upanisad (iv. lo), but the idea
may be traced to the later stage of the Vedic civiliza-
tion. We shall endeavour to show that the con-
ception, though not in a systematic and organic
form, is already found in the R.V. and the Upanisads.
Philosophy, as reflective thought, or the thinking
consideration of things,^ did actually begin with
things ] that is to say, the first germs of philosophy
began to appear with an attempt to explain the
concrete realities in the environment, i.e., the Uni-
verse. A yearning was noticeable in the human
breast to comprehend the source of all existence.
And as aU higher development is from the concrete
to the abstract, thought too followed the same course,
and after passing through the stages in which the
different forces of nature, or various other elements,
such as water, air, fire, etc., began to be imagined
as the chief source of aU existences, the point was
reached where the " many " was found to yield no
satisfactory explanation of its being, and a desire was
felt to know the mystery, the underlying unity.
With the advance in thought, the principle of unity
attracted more and more attention, so much so that
as early as in R.V. i. 164 (" ekaip sad viprabahudha
vadanti " — i.e., the poets speak of the One Being
under various names), the multiplicity was felt to
be due to a mode of speech only, not real in itself,

!■ Cf . Schwegler, Geschichte der PMlosophie, Stuttgaxt, Ein-
leitung : " Philosophieren ist Nachdenken, denkende Betra-
chtung der Dinge,"

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 37

only the One having real existence. The inniuner-
able Vedic gods began thus to be conceived as not
at war with one another, but only manifestations of
One God. Monotheism conquered Polytheism in
its exclusive sense. The last book of the R.V. is
particularly rich in philosophic hymns, many of
which strike a chord of the same sentiment of " unity
underlying diversity." The bold speculation of
the ancient Vedic people is picturesquely portrayed
in R.V. X. 129 — one of the earliest records known
of an attempt at explaining the cosmogonic mystery
by grasping the idea of unity. It is one of the most
sublime and exalted h3mins in the R.V., both from
the philosophic and the literary standpoints, and is
a true index to the early mystic thought of the
Hindus. To a somewhat prejudiced mind it may
appear as a mere conglomeration of contradictions
and a piece of abstract sophistry. But it is one of
the finest songs that any literature may be proud
of. Deussen describes it as " the most remarkable
monument of the oldest philosophy,^ " and has
translated it into German. = As the hymn is very
important for our purpose, we give our own trans-
lation as follows —

^ Deussen, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Berlin, 1907,
p. 13, I. 20.

* Deussen, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i., p. 126, and
also in his Geheimlehre des Veda, zweite Auflage, Leipzig,
1907, p. 3. The hymn has been translated by many, but
most oi the translations seem to be incorrect in places.

38 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

R.V. X. 129.

1. Then was neither Being nor Non-Being,

No realm of air, no sky beyond ;
What enveloped all ? Where ? In whose care ?
Were waters there, the deep abyss ?

2. 'Twas neither death nor life immortal.

No night was there, no day's appearance ;
The One in its spontaneity did airless breathe.
Beyond it naught was in existence.

3. Darkness was thei'e ; at first by darkness covered.

The world was ocean without distinction ;
But a pregnant germ lay hidden in shell.
The One engendered by force of heat.

4. Within it at first arose Desire,

Which was the primal seed of mind ;
The root of Being in Non-Being Sages
Searching by wisdom in the heart discovered.

5. When like a ray their being they spread.

What was below ? what was above ?

Seed-bearers were there, great powers too.

Spontaneity beneath and effort above.

6. Who knows, in sooth ? Who here can tell ?

Whence it became ? Whence this creation ?
The gods came later than its creation,
So who can tell whence all this arose ?

7. From whom arose this whole creation.

Whether he produced it or not he ;
Who in highest heaven surveys it.
He knows it well — or even not he.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 39

This marks the beginnings of philosophical
thought in India. The same conception of the basal
unity of the world afterwards gave rise to Greek
philosophy in the Eleatic monism. Xenophanes
started his polemic against the anthropomorphism
in popular Greek religion and was the first among
Greek thinkers to declare " AU is one." A Httle
later Parmenides too developed, as his chief princi-
ple, the same idea of the essential oneness of being
and thought. We point out this fact simply to show
that it was quite natural and legitimate that the
Vedic poets should begin their philosophical specu-
lation with their yearning to comprehend the under-
lying unity of the world. That the yearning was
natural is amply shown by almost exactly the same
tendencies being found in other philosophies, especi-
ally in that of Greece. As in Greece, so in India,
philosophy was bom as " the child of wonder."

Garije, who has done a good deal of useful work in
the Sankhya, has unfortunately failed to reaUze
the spirit in which the above hymn was composed
by the Vedic Aryans, and finds in it as well as in
other philosophical hymns in the R.V., " unclear
and self-contradictory trains of thought." ^ We
fail to perceive any such contradictions. The vari-
ous explanations are in themselves demanded by the
very mysterious nature of the problem. It may be
remarked in passing that the Being and Non-Being

1 Richard Garbe, The Philosophy of Ancient India,
Chicago, 1897, p. I.

40 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

spoken of in the hj^mn do not stand in antithesis
(as they do in early Greek philosophy) ; on the
contrary, they are one, though they are two from
our way of looking at them.^ The undeveloped
state, known as kdranavasthd, is spoken of as Non-
Being — ^it does not mean the negation of Being;
while the manifested state is called by the name
of Being.

This also explains why Being is said to be bom of
Non-Being in R.V. x. 72. 2-3, and the root of the
former is discovered in the latter (R.V. x. 129. 4).
There might appear many such contradictions im-
phed in the use of terms, but they are only seeming
contradictions, and vanish as soon as the real recon-
ciHation (vyavastha) is made out.

Now, after attaining a consciousness of the one-
ness of aU things, the next step was naturally a quest
after the nature of this unit y. An attempt is made
to^determine it in R.V. x. 121, where, after describ-
ing the majesty and wonder of the vast network of
creation, the poet at last names Prajapati as the
unknown god, the ultimate unity of aU creation.

"Prajapati, than thou there is no other.
Who holds in his embrace the whole creation."

This idea of Prajapati is subsequently transformed
under the name of Brahman or Atman in the Upani-

^ On this idea see Sankara's commentary on Vedanta-
Sutras, i. 4. 15, p. 376, II. 7-10 (Bibl. Ind. edn.).

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 41

sads. However, in another Vedic hymn (R.V. x.
90) we see the same power attributed to " Purusa "
(who, we beheve, is one with Prajapati in general
conception), and in R.V. x. 81 and 82 to Vilva-
karman. In R.V. x. 72 the same fimctions are
referred to Brahmanaspati —

" Brahmanaspati like a smith
Together forged this universe ;
When gods existed not as yet.
Then Being from Non-Being did arise."

Later on, Prajapati is identified with the creating
word 1 (the Greek " Logos ") in R.V. x. 125, and
with " the sacrifice. and the year " as principles of

1 On the relation between the Indian conception of Vac
and the Greek conception of A,oyos, see Weber's Indische
Studien, vol. ix. Cf. also Max Heinze, Die Lehre vom
Logos in der Griechischen Philosophie, Oldenberg, 1872. In
numerous passages Vac also appears as the consort of Pra-
japati, the creator.

R.V. X. 90, has been translated .by Max MuUer, A ncient
Sk. Lit. (1859), p. 569 ; Muir, O.S.T., iv. i6 ; Ludwig, No.
948 ; Grassmann, ii. 398 ; Max Miiller, Hibhert Lectures
(1882), p. 301 ; Henry W. WaUis, Cosmology of the R.V.,
p. 50 ; Max MiiUer, Vedic Hymns, S.B.E., xxxii. i ; Deus-
sen, Geschichte, i. i. 132.

With some variants, this hymn is found in A.V. iv. 2,
which has been translated by Weber, xviii. 8 ; Oldenberg,
Die Hymnen des R.V., i. 314 f., Bloomfield, JAOS, xv. 184.
V.S. xxxi. 18 (=§vetas. Up. iii. 8 : Muir v. p. 373) refer
to Purusa : —

" I know this great Purusha, resplendent as the sun,
above the darkness. It is by knowing him that a man

\

42 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the world, R.V. x. 190. We here insert the former
in our own translation, as it is one of the typical
hjmins of the Rigvedic speculation and is important
for our purpose —

R.V. X. 125.1
Vac.

1. I wander with the Rudras and the Vasus,
With the Adityas and the Visve Devas ;

I support both, Mitra and Varuna,
Indra and Agni, and the Asvins two.

2. I support Soma, swelling with juice,
I support Tvastf, Pusan and Bhaga ;

'Tis I who give wealth to the zealous offerer.
To the sacrificer who presses Soma.

3. I am the queen, the showerer of riches.
The knowing, first of the worshipped ones ;
Me have the gods in many forms displayed.
Me, living everywhere and entering all things.

ever passes death. There is no other road to go." Cf.
V.S. xxxii. 2.

Muir, p. 374. All winkings of the eye have sprung from
Purusa, the resplendent. No one has limited him either
above, or below, or in the middle.

The first .two verses of R.V. x. 90 are given in the Svetas-
vat. Up. iii. 14, 15. Cf. A.V. xix. 4, 5. 6. 7. Colebrooke's
Misc. Essays, i. 167 and note in p. 309.

1 For translations of the hymn, see Colebrooke, Asiatic
Researches, vol. viii., Calcutta, 1805, or Miscellaneous
Essays, i., p. 28 ; Weber's article on " Vac and Logos,"
Ind. Stiid.Jix. (1865), 473 ; Deussen, Geschichte, vol. i. 1.
146 f . ; Grifi&th, i. 171-; Weber, xviii. 117. The whole
hymn is found with slight variants in A.V. iv. 30.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 43

4. Through me he eats food, who sees.
Who breathes, who hears what's spoken ;
Not knowing me they stay by me.

Hear thou of fame, I tell thee what's not easy to know.

worthy of belief.
(Muir.)
to be credited.
(Whitney.)

5. It is I myself who declare this truth,
Agreeable to gods and men alike ;

I make him powerful, whom I love.

Him a Brahma (Brahmana), a Rsi, a sage.

6. It's I who bend the bow for Rudra,

That his arrow may strike the foe of BrShmana,

It's I who fight for my peoples' sake.

It's I who have entered both heaven and earth.

7. I create Father (Dyaus), first on the world's summit, ^
My birth-place is in the waters, in the ocean ;
Then I into all things existing enter,

And touch yonder heaven with my body.

8. It's I who blow forth like the wind.
Spreading into being all that exist ;
Beyond the sky, beyond this earth.
So great have I by my glory become.

The unit y of existe nce could not be more siHj ply
an d emphatically pronounced than in thesejiy mns.
When the goddess Vac says in stanza 3,

^ This line is difficult to translate quite accurately.
The extant translations do not throw any light on it. Whit-
ney too leaves it open to doubt in his Atharva-veda, Trans,
and Notes, vol. i., p. 201.

44 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

" Me have the gods in many forms displayed.
Me, living everywhere and entering all things,"

she repeats the same thought we have already referred
to, which again is expressed by the Rsi Dlrgha-
tamas while praising Agni —

" Of the one existence, the sages speak in diverse ways." —

R.V. i. 164.

And the same thought was later on brought out by
Yaska (who lived about the fifth century, b.c.) : —
" The One Atman is sung in many ways " (Nir.
vii. 5, Roth's ed., p. 11). Some of the other Vedic
hsmins in which this conception of the underlying
unity of being is brought out are R.V. x. 81, 82,
90, 121, etc., which we can only refer to, instead of
translating here. All this clearly shows that this
i dea of unity is as old as the Vedic civilization , that
the ancient Indian Rsis were quite aware of the one-
ness of being and gave a poetic expression to the
same thought in many beautiful strains.

It is needless to multiply instances from the other
three Vedas, since the R.V. is the chief source of
these and is in itself the oldest and most important
one. Most of the h5anns of the other Vedas are
bodily transferred from the R.V. and arranged in
different ways to meet the spirit and requirements
of each. We may, however, note in passing that
the same idea of the unity of being is discovered in
the following stanzas from the A.V. —

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 45

" Aditi is heaven, Aditi atmosphere,
Aditi mother, she father, she son ;
All the gods are Aditi, the five races,
Aditi is what is born, Aditi what is to be born."

A.V. vii. 6. i.i

" Whoever know the Brahman in man, they know the
most exalted one ; whoever know the most exalted one,
and whoever know Prajapati, whoever know the chief
Brahmana, they know also accordingly the Skambha."

"The great being (Yaksa) ' is absorbed in austere fer-
vour in the midst of the world, on the surface of the waters.
In it are set whatever gods there are, as the branches of a
tree around the trunk." '

A.V. X. 7. 17, and 38.

" What moves, flies and stands, breathing,
not-breathing and winking ; that
universal form sustains the earth,
that combined becomes One only."

A.V. X. 8. II.

" PrajSpati goes about within the womb ;
Unseen, yet is manifestly born." *

A.V. X. 8. 13.

1 Compare R.V. i. 89. 10 ; V.S. xxv. 23 ; T.A. i. 13. 2 ;
and M.S. iv. 14. 4. For a similar sentiment in reference to
Viraj, see A.V. ix. 10. 24.

' For a discussion on " Yaksa " (cf. also A.V. x. 8. 15)
see Geldner, Vedische Studien, ui. 126 S. j also Kena Up.,
iii. 14-25 ; Deussen, Sechsig Upanisads, p. 204, Einleitung.

» This is from the well-known A.V. hymn on the Skam-
bha or the Frame of Creation. For translation see Muir's
Sanskrit Texts, vol. v., pp. 380-384 ; Ludwig, p. 400 ;
Deussen, Geschichte, i. 1. 310 ; Griffith, ii. 26 ; and Whit-
ney's A.V. vol. ii. p. 589. The translation is taken from
Whitney.

* For translation of A.V. x. 8. see Muir, v., p. 386 ;

46 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

" Knowing the soul, free from desire, wise, immortal,
self-existent, satisfied with the essence, not deficient in
any respect, one is not afraid of death." '■

A.V. X. 8. 44.

" They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni ; likewise he
is the heavenly-winged eagle ; what is one the sages name
variously ; they call him Agni, Yama, Matarisvan." *

A.V. ix. 10. 28.

These typical passages point to a continuation of
the same idea in the A.V. The Brahmanas, the
exegetical treatises on the Samhitas, being mainly
guided by the Sruti,* and starting with the object
of making expHcit what is imphcitly implied in the
mantras, may naturally be supposed not to swerve
from the general spirit of the latter. What is al-
ready explicit in the mantras is sometimes only
emphasized in these treatises. The transition from
the earher thought of the Samhita to that of the
Brahmanas may be noticed, for instance, in R.V.
X. 81, where the question is asked —

Ludwig, p. 395 ; Deussen, Geschichte, i. 1. 318 ; Grif&th,
ii. 34.

^ Compare what Deussen remarks on this passage :
" die erste und alteste Stelle, die wir kennen, in der ruck-
haltlos der Atman als Weltprincip proklamiert wird, A.V.
X. 8. 44," [Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i., p. 334).

2 See Whitney's A.V., p. 561,

* The Brahmanas in regard to their subject-matter are
supposed by some to be " uditS,nuvadah " — i.e., they ex-
plain in detail what is already given in the Veda. (Cf.
Yaska, Nirukta, i. 16. Roth's ed., p. 37, " uditanuvadah
sa bhavati.")

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 47

" Which wEis the tree, which was the wood, of which they
hewed the earth and heaven ? "

This question is repeated in the text of the Taittiriya
Brahmana, and is followed by the answer —

" Brahman was the tree, the wood from which they hewed
the earth and heaven."

The conception of Prajapati and of Purusa is
also developed in the Vajasaneyl Samhita and the
Taittiriya Brahmana.^ The simple note of unity
is also sounded, for instance, in the Satap. Br., iv.
2. 2. I. —

" sarvam hy ayam atmS," i.e., " this soul is everything."

We are, however, mainly concerned with the
Upanisads, which are, as a rule, the final positions
of the Brahmanas. The word is derived from the
root sad, to sit, with the prepositions ttpa, near, and
m=very (adverbial), and conveys the sense, " that
which is imparted to a pupil when he sits very near
his teacher " — Whence, " secret doctrine." The Up-
anisads may, therefore, be said to embody the esoteric
doctrines of the Vedas. They mostly contain philo-
sophical expositions, elucidations and discussions
on some Vedic passages, and by themselves form a
more or less complete and comprehensive philoso-

* Cf. V.S. viii. 36 ; xxxi. 18-21 ; xxxiv. 1-6, etc. ; T.A.
i. 23. 9 ; T.B. ii. 8. 8. 8-10 ; ii. 8. 9. 6-7 ; iii. 12. 9.

/

48 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

phical system, which is the kernel of the whole of the
later philosophy. Their idealism is the groimdstone
of the later Vedanta. They are canonical, and
quotations from them are held by tradition ever
complete and self-sufficient and require no further
support. They are final authorities.^ The general
trend of their thought is towards a thorough-going
monism, which in its germinal form existed even in
the Vedas, as we have shown above. Their funda-
mental formula may be expressed in a well-known
distich —

" Brahma satyam jagan mithya
Jivo brahmaiva naparah."
i. .,

" Brahman is the Reality, the universe is false,
The Atman is Brahman, nothing else."

In other words, there is only one Reality, call it
Brahman or Atman — what you will, and the world
around us which appears so real is not so. This is
the central thought which has been so admirably

I It may be interesting to know that the Upanisads
form the chief source of quotations in Sankara's Sariraka-
Bhasya. According to the frequency of their occurrence
in Sankara's monumental commentary they may thus be
arranged in order —

Chandogya, 809 quotations ; BrhadSranyaka, 565 ;
Taittirlya, 142 ; Mundaka, 129 ; Katha, 103 ; Kausitaki,
88 ; Svetasvatara, 53 ; Agni-Rahasya (Sat. Br. x.), 40 ;
Prasna, 38 ; Aitareya (Ait. Ar. ii. 4-6), 22 ; Jabala, 13 ;
Narayaniya (Taitt. Ar. x.), 9 ; Isa (Vaj. Sam. xl.), 8 ;
Paidgi, 6 ; Kena, 5.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 49

expanded and developed in various ways in thev
Upanisads, and what we call the doctrine of Maya 1
is nothing more than an attempt to explain this facf^
in detail, to show how it is impossible for the world
to be anything more than an " appearance " as dis-
tinguished from " Reality," which strictly speaking
is only Brahman. \

We now come to one of the most important parts
of our present subject, viz., the development of the
theory of Maya through the Upanisads down to
Sankara. We may remark at the outset that the
theory may be enunciated in two ways : (i) That
the world is an illusion or appearance, and (2) That
the only reality is the Atman. These two state-
ments mean the same thing, so that the passages
which emphasize the statement that the Atman is
the only reality mean most transparently that all
else (i.e., other than the Atman, viz., the world, etc.)
is not real. '

The Upanisads when read through without any
guiding principle seem to bristle with startling con-
tradictions. The world is described as pervaded
by the Atman, and it is said that all this is Brah-
man, while at the same time it is asserted that the
world is unreal ; again, it is declared that the Atman
created the world, while yet it is true that there is
no world besides Brahman. All such and other state-
ments would perhaps baffle all attempts at explana-
tion if only we looked at the external aspect, and
some readers of the Upanisads may consequently

50 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

with great impatience pronounce these books to be
nothing but a mass of crude contradictions. But it
is not so. There is to be traced within the Upani-
sads a certain development (" degeneration," from
another point of view) of Pure Ideahsm. In the Brh.
Upanisad ^ are found certain passages, chiefly in the
first four chapters, which are connected with the dis-
course of Yajnavalkya, and which furnish the oldest
idealistic conception as far as we know.

Yajnavalkya's standpoint is purely metaphysical.
He was the leader of the sages, and he is said to Ijave
quite realized his identity with the Brahman.

One seems to be carried away by the simple force
of his lofty utterances, which appear to be poured
out from the very depths of his heart after a thorough
realization of the truths they contain. His dialogues
with his wife Maitre}^ and with the king Janaka
appeal to us as the clearest enunciations of the true
standpoint of Idealism, which on account of its
extremely monistic conception cannot be surpassed,
a more thorough-going monism being prima facie
impossible. The burden of the whole throughout
is that

" the Atman is the only reality,"
which at once implies that the world is not real. We

J- The Bfhad Up. and the Chan. Up. seem to be the oldest
among the collection. It is rather difficult to say which of
these two is the older. Judging from style and other evi-
dences, especially the parallel texts, etc., it appears that
the Brh. was the older.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 51

shall now examine some of these passages, in order
to give a more concrete idea of the general position
maintained by the old idealist —

" Atma va are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo nidi-
dhyasitavyo Maitreyi — Atmano va are darsanena sravanena
matya vijnanenaidam sarvam viditam " (Bfh. Up. ii. 4. 5).
i.e..

The Atman is to be seen, heard, understood, meditated —
O Maitreyi ; by seeing, hearing, understanding and realiz-
ing the Atman, all this world is known.

This is repeated again in iv. 5. 6.

The same idea is expressed by means of three
similes, viz., of the drum (dundubhih), the conch-
shell, and the lyre. As by holding fast the drum,
the conch-shell, the lyre, when they are being
beaten, all their sounds are as it were caught together,
so by knowing the Atman all is known, i.e., all worth
knowing becomes already known. When these
instruments are being sounded one cannot hear any-
thing else and is confused in the multiphcity of the
sounds, but on taking possession of the instruments
— the source of all the sounds — one seems to have
mastered the discord and to have found the key to
it all. So is the Atman the key to the all, viz., to
the universe ; when the Atman is known then there is
nothing else that is worth knowing ; the multiplicity
perishes and the unity asserts its sway. The follow-
ing is the passage containing these three similes —

" sa yatha dundubher hanyamanasya na biihyan sabdan

52 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

saknuyad grahanaya, dundubhes tu grahanena dundubhy-
aghatasya va sabdo grhitah." — Brh. Up. ii. 4. 7.1
i.e..
As in the midst of drum-beating one is unable to grasp
the outer sounds, but on grasping the drum itself the sound
produced by the drum-beating is also grasped.

A most remarkable passage, which in the clearest
phraseology endorses the conception of Maya, is
found in Brh. ii. 4. 14. It runs thus —

" Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram jighrati
tad itara itaram pasyati tad itara itaram sfnoti tad itara
itaram abhivadati tad itara itaram manute tad itara itaram
vijanati, yatra va asya sarvam atmaivabhiit tat kena kam
jighret tat kena kam pasyet tat kena kam smuyat tat kena
kam abhivadet tat kena kam manvita tat kena kam vij aniyad
yenedam sarvam vijanati tam kena vij aniyad vijnataram
are kena vijaniyad iti."

Brh. Up. ii. 4. 14.'

{Trans.) —
For where there is duality, as it were, there sees another
another thing, there smells another another thing, there
hears another another thing, there speaks another of another
thing, there thinks another of another thing, there knows
another another thing ; but where all has become nothing
but the Atman, there how can one smell anything, how see
anything, how hear anything, how speak of anything, how
think of anything, how know anything. By what shall one
know him, by whom knows one this all ? By what shall
one know the knower ?

1 Cf . also Ibid., ii. 4. 8. The same passage is again found
in iv. 5. 8-10.

» This famous passage reappears in Bfh. Up. iv. 5. 15,
with slight alterations, ;

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 53

The word iva (= as it were) is important here.
" Where there is duahty, as it were " shows that
duality, which refers to the multiphcity (nanatva)
in the world, is unreal ; in other words, it is only an
appearance. The conception of subject and object
is only possible when each of them has at least
a distinguishable existence. But when all this
" otherness " is found to be false, that which was
called the " object " disappears and only the one
Atman remains as the knower. In that sense even
the word " subject " (in the current sense) would
be inadmissible, since it is only a relative term, and
when the object perishes, the idea of the subject
also goes with it. The distinction is lost, that which
was real remains as the one, and the unreal, which
never did actually exist, is found to be a nullity. The
Atman being itself the Knower, the self-luminous,
the Universal Spirit, does not require any medium
to be known. That is the idea which Yajiiavalkya
so simply and yet so forcibly conveys when he says —

" vijnataram are kena vijaniyat ? "
i.e.,

By what shall the knower be known ?

Further on Yajnavalkya, while instructing the
sage Usasta on the nature of the Atman, says —

" na drster drastaram pasyer na sruter srotaram srnu-
yan na mater mantaram manvitha na vijnater vijnataram
vijaniyah esa ta atma sarvantaro 'to 'hyad axttam."

Bfh. Up. iii. 4. 2.
(Trans.) —
" Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst

54 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

not hear the hearer of hearing, thou couldst not think the
thinker of thought, thou couldst not know the knower of
knowing. This thy Atman is within every being, all else
is full of sorrow (drtta).

Here it is shown how the Atman is so near within
one's self that one does not need to go a long way to
search for it. If the idea of distance is to be used
at all (which is reaUy inadmissible) it may be s^id
to be the nearest. Those who go out to seek it
anjTwhere else by external means never find it.
The attempts at a rigid definition of Brahman are
aU futile. This thought is hke that of the popular
tale so weU known in India. A man had his little
child on his shoulder and was stroUing about in the
street. All of a sudden, forgetting that he had
the child with him, he began to proclaim in a loud
voice throughout the city : "I have lost my child ;
who has seen it, kindly let me know." At last a
passer-by, observing his gross error, gave him a
smart slap in the face and turned his eyes upward,
when to his utter surprise he found that the " lost
child " was still on him.^ So exactly is the Atman
always in us. In fact we are never justified in
sajdng " in us " as truly speaking " it is ourself,"
not "it is in us " ; the latter would imply that we
are different from the Atman. The sage here
declares, therefore, that this Atman is the subject of

* The proverb is technically known in Punjabi as " kuc-.
chad kudi Sahara dhandora."

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 55

all knowledge, hence unknowable. The categories
of aU knowledge break down when stretched with
a view to their application to the Atman. And as
to all else, which is " the other," the sage says
" ato anyat artam," i.e., all else is full of sorrow.
This phrase is repeated again in iii. 5. i, in a dialogue
with Kahola. This " other than the Self," i.e.,
the so-called world, is again denied its reality in
iii. 8. II, where Yajnavalkya is instructing Gargi
(who was of a highly philosophic temperament)" in
the mysterious love of the Brahman.

In Brh. Up. iv. 4. 4, again, the simile of a goldsmith
is employed. As he by taking a bit of gold moulds
it into various newer and more beautiful forms,
so the Atman is supposed to create through Avidyd
various forms, such as the Pitjis, the Gandharvas,
the gods, Prajapati, Brahma, etc. Here aU the
variety of forms is spoken of as avidyd, hence unreal.
It may, however, be pointed out that similes illus-
trate only a special aspect of truth and should not
be carried beyond their legitimate sphere.

The phrase " avidyam gamayitva " occurs in
this mantra as weU as in the preceding one, where
an example of the caterpillar is given.

Another remarkable passage that lends a decisive
support to this pure idealism occurs in Brh. iv. 4.

19—

" mahasaiva anudrastavyam
neha .nana 'sti kincana,
mftyd]i sa mftyum apnoti
ya iha naneva pasyati."

56 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

{Trans.) —

It is to be perceived by the mind alone,
there is here no multiplicity whatever ;
who sees here as it were " many "
passes from death to death.

That mtiltiplicity, the characteristic of the uni-
verse, is false is the high-sounding note here, and
it is still further emphasized by saying that he who
sees as it were a plurality actually existing is never
saved, but is over and over subject to the pangs of
birth and death in this samsara. The conception
of Maya exhibits itself in such passages clearly,
and yet many do not see it. Here also attention
may specially be drawn to the word iva — " as it
were " — which implies that the multiplicity is
only an appearance, an " as it were." Truly speak-
ing, this " as it were " should be supplied in almost
all passages where the Upanisads speak of " the
other." It would be quite in keeping with the
spirit of true idealism.

This exactly is the highest (and the truest) stand-
point of the Upanisads. When they deny in such
clear and distinct terms the existence of " the
many," it means that they refuse to concede any
reality to the world from that standpoint, the idea
of the world being meaningless without all this
nana (multiplicity) . Abstract ' ' the many ' ' and you
bring the world to a zero-point, nothing remains
behind ; aU vanishes.

All the words which we use in our every-day

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 57

life to express the various distinctions among objects,
or " the many," are mere abuses of our speech,
since they are ill-spent or wasted, " the many "
having no existence at aU. Only " the One "
exists, and when that is known all else is known,
and the use of words breaks down. This idea is
expressed in Brh. iv. 4. 21 —

" tam eva dhiro vijnaya prajnam kurvita brahmanah,
nanudhyayad bahun sabdan vaco viglSpanam hi tat."
{Trans.) —

Knowing him alone let the wise Brahmana form his prajfia
(understanding), let him not meditate on many words,
for that is simply the fatigue of vac (speech) .

This in brief is the spirit of Yajnavalkya's Ideal-
ism. It may conveniently be viewed in three
aspects : —

1. The Atman is the only reality.

2. The Atman is the subject of knowledge in us

(cf. iii. 4. 2, iii. 7. 23, iii. 8. 11), hence

3. The Atman is itself unknowable. (Cf. ii. 4. 14,

iv. 5. 15, etc.)

It may be pointed out that there is no contradic-
tion, as many have been led to suppose, in the state-
ments " the Atman is unknowable " and " by
knowing the Atman all is known " or " the Atman
alone is to be known." The word " knowledge "
is used in two different aspects. The Atman is
" unknowable " when by knowledge is meant a

58 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

synthesis of the subject and object, or when it is
supposed that speech is able to describe the Self^
The knower, the self, can know the known or the
objects, but how can the knower be known ? The
truth of the idea is not very difficult to grasp, if
one just reflects seriously for a moment. If all
things are known only through the " I," by what
can the "I" itself be known ? The fact of this
self-consciousness is ultimate in itself.^ Hence in
this sense the knower cannot be known, while at
the same time no _ knowledge could be more sure
than that of the knower, the self. Here " know-
ledge " is used in a higher and different sense, viz.,
self-realization or experience (anubhava). Even
the greatest sceptic could not reasonably deny the
existence of the " I," and a higher knowledge of
this self means the realization of the falsity of the
not-self and of the oneness of the Atman. The
seeming paradox therefore disappears on a Uttle
deeper understanding.

Now this oldest, simplest and most thorough-
going idealism is found chiefly in the Brh. Up., as
shown above, but it is not totally ousted by the
later doctrines in revolt, and so appears scattered
here and there among the others in the chief Upani-
sads as well. The doctrine of the sole reality of

1 Similar analogies may be noticed in European philoso-
phy. Descartes, e.g., started with this very fact, Cogito,
ergo sum. Almost all idealists start with self-consciousness
as the ultimate fact.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 59

the Atman — Whence of the falsity of the world,- " the
Many " — ^has never been totally given up later on.
Certainly it has been gradually obscured — though
at the same time shining through by its inherent
light — by the huge mass of more realistic or anti-
idealistic notions. Such conceptions we may have
occasion to refer to briefly later on. We hasten
now to show how this supreme monistic conceptio n
runs through th e other Upanisads like a string
thrc5ligh'"TEe^ beads of a garland.

T-aming^ -to- the-C handogy a- Up., we at once meet
with the famous dialogue between Aruni and his
son, Svetaketu. The son having studied all the
Vedas, etc., for twelve years with his teacher,
returned to his father a swollen-headed young
scholar. The father tested his knowledge by asking
him if he knew anything about that by which all
that is unheard becomes heard and the unknown
becomes the known, etc. The son, failing to answer,
requests his father to explain to him that know-
ledge, and the sage Aruni teaches Svetaketu by
the following concrete examples —

" yatha somya ekena mftpindena sarvam mrnmayam
vijnatam syad vacarambhanam vikaro n3,inadheyam mrtti-
kety eva satyam.

Chan. Up. vi. i. 4.1

1 Cf. the same idea in dififerent similes in the following
two mantras, Chan. Up. vi. i. 5-6.

6o THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

(Trans.) —
As, O good one, by (the knowledge of) one ball of earth
everjrthing of the nature of earth is known ; the change (or
modification) is an extension of words, a mere name, only
the earth is true.^

Here it is said that by knowing the one the all
is known. As all the forms into which clay is

1 Some critics of the Vedanta discover in this passage a
corroboration of the theory of Parinamavdda. They con-
tend that as the various things of earth (jar, pot, etc.) are
transformations of the earth, not being creations of the
imagination {Sat coming out of Sat only), so is the world as
sat a development of a subtle sat. Some of the modern
evolutionists would also urge that the world is simply a
process of evolution of the one principle — ^by whatever name
you may call it, matter, spirit, thought, or the Atman. Accord-
ing to these views the Self transforms itself into Natura
Naturata, and as a real cause has a real effect, the world
must be a reality. The Saiikhya system is also based on
such a theory, which makes the world a reality, being an
actual modification or development of real matter.

This view appears to be based on an exclusively one-
sided interpretation of the passage. The whole rests on
the assumption that things like the jar, etc., are actual
transformations of earth. But the passage seems to us to
endorse the purely idealistic standpoint, making the world,
to use later phraseology, a vivarta instead of a vikara.

The vivarta of a substance is simply its appearance, which
in no way implies any alteration in the thing itself ; while
a vikara is the transformation of the substance itself.
(" Vivarta ^= atattvato 'nyatha pratha ; vikara = satat-
tvato 'nyatha pratha." To take a well-known technical
example, milk is substantially transformed into curd or
junket : these are two wholly different states — one cannot
discover any milk when it is changed into curd. But
a jar of earth, even after individuating itself as a jar, does

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 6i

moulded are known by knowing clay, so the mani-
fold world is known by knowing the one Atman,
since all reaUty is the Atman and the non-Atman
does not really exist. The " many forms " are
merely " the beginning of speech " (vacarambhanam),
only a mere name (namadheyam) without reality.
The plurality is all a mere name, hence unreal.^

In Ch. vi. 2. 1-2, where the process of creation
is described from the empirical standpoint, the
words " ekam-eva-advitiyam " (" the only one
without a second ") occur, which point out the
essential oneness of the Atman.

Again, in Chan. Up. vii. 23. i we read —

" yo vai bhuma tat sukham, naipe sukham asti bhumaiva
sukham bhuma tv eva vijijnasitavya iti."
(Trans.) —
That which is the Bhuma (the Great) is happiness, there

not cease to be earth ; it is earth inside and out, the
idea of jar is simply due to the limitations ojE name
and form, which are decidedly mind-dependent. The
evidence of the jar quA jar is not at all independent.
So also when a rope is mistaken for a snake, it is not
transformed into the latter. It is the mind imposing the
conception of the snake on the rope. The former has no
independent existence. This example of the rope, etc., is
a typical one for the vivarta-theory, but it is evident how
the implications of the analogy of the earth correspond
with those of this one. Hence the passage, judged both
from its contextual spirit and analogies, supports the idea
of vivarta, not of vikara.

'^ The words "vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam"
again occur in Chan. Up. vi, 4. 1-3.

62 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

is no happiness in the small. Only the Bhuma is happi-
ness. The Bhuma is therefore to be searched after.

In this passage Brahman is spoken of as Bhuma
(the Great), and only He is said to be bliss; all
that is not Brahman (= the Atman) is alpam
(little) and misery. Only that Bhuma is worthy
of being known. The words tu eva are important,
since they emphasize the exclusive knowledge of
the Atman alone. In the following khanda (Chan,
vii. 24. i) that Bhiima is defined as —

" yatra na any at pasyati na anyat sfnoti na anyat vijan-
ati sa bhuma."
{Trans.) —

Where none other sees, none other hears, none other
knows, that is Bhtima.

And the Alpa is defined as —

" yatra anyat pasyati anyat sfnoti anyadvijanati tad al-
pam."

{Trans.) —

Where another sees, another hears, another knows, that
is Alpa.

The latter is declared to be perishable ("tat mar-
tyam "). When the nature of multiplicity is real-
ized to be false " the other " (anya) will cease to
exist and only the Bhuma will shine in his ever-
lasting luminosity.

The Taitt. Up. does not contain much on the
subject. It is mainly concerned with the more
reaUstic conception of the creation of the world

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 63

from the Atman.^ There is of course a famous
passage on the unknowableness of the Atman.

" yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha,
anandam brahmano vidvan na bibheti kadacana."

ii. 4 and ii. 9.
{Trans.) —
Whence words return with the mind without having reached
it, knowing the bliss of that Brahman, one never fears.

So, too, the Ait. Up, has very httle to contribute
to the subject. In one place (iii. 1-3) the Atman
is defined as consciousness (prajnana), and then
elephants, cows, men, trees, animals, etc., are caUed
the names (namadheyani) of consciousness, which
is identified with Brahman (prajnanam Brahma).
This means that aU things exist only so far as they
are my consciousness, which is a unity ; hence
the multiplicity which seems to exist independent
of my consciousness is not real, but only a mere name.

The Katha Up., one of the comparatively late
Upanisads, is one of the finest productions on the
subject, and contains many passages that are fre-
quently quoted by the modern Indian Vedantists.
It is attractive moreover owing to the pecuHarly
fascinating and interesting legend of Naciketa,
meant to expound the lore of the Atman so as to
be acceptable even to those who are tired too soon
of abstract conceptions and want something to

1 Cf. Taitt Up. ii. i, ii. 6, iii. i, etc.

64 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

colour such notions. In i. 2. 5, the god of Death
points out to Naciketa how the ignorant in their
avidyd follow one another like the bhnd.

" avidyayam antare vartamanah svayamdhirah pandi-
' tammanyamanah,

dandramyamanah pariyanti mudhah andhenaiva niya-
mana yathandhah." ^

(Cf. Mund. Up. i. 2. 8.)

(Trans.) —
Dwelling in the midst of darkness, " wise in their own
conceit," " and taking themselves to be very learned, the
ignorant go round and round, staggering to and fro, like
blind men led by the blind.

Such are the people who always look to the exter-
nal and the immediate aspect of things and never
look beyond. Imitating others blindly, they also
imagine the not-self to be the self. And such people
in their own ignorance regard themselves very
learned (panditam-manyamanah), because self-
conceit is the index to shallowness of knowledge
or ignorance. The more one knows, the humbler
one becomes.

The most satisfactory passages, however, come
later in Katha ii. The one is almost identical with
Bfh. iv. 4. 19, which has already been quoted
above.

1 Cf. Mund. Up. i. 2. 8 ; Katha Up. ii. 5 ; also Maitr.
vii. 9. (where we have only ^ht^: for ^flTRT:
« See S.B.E. xv., p. 8.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 65

" yad eveha tad amutra yad amutra tad anv iha
mftyoh sa mrtyum apnoti ya iha naneva pasyatL"

Katha Up. ii. 4. 10.
(Trans.) —
What is here, the same is in the next world ; and what
is in the next world, the same is here ; he who sees here, as
it were, " differences " (or " the many ") goes from death
to death.

Here, as we have already seen, the multiplicity
is pronounced false ; he who even imagines it
to be true does not attain liberation. The same
thought is stated in the next mantra —

" manasaiva idam avaptavyam
neha nana asti kincana

mrtyoh sa mrtyum apnoti ya iha naneva pasyati."

Katha Up. ii. 4. 11.
(Trans.) —
Only by the mind this is to be obtained ; there is no
multiplicity here whatsoever ; he goes from death to death
who sees any multiplicity here.

Here again the fact that there is no multiplicity
whatever is particularly emphasized, hence the
universe, which is the embodiment of this idea of
multipUcity, is false.

The conception of the Atman is further explained
in ii. 5. 13—

" nityo anityanam cetanas cetananam
eko bahiinam yo vidadhati kaman
tam atmastham ye 'nupasyanti dhiras
tesam santih sasvati netaresam." >■

1 Cf. Svet. Up. vi. 13.

66 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

(Trans.) —
Eternal of the transient, Soul of the souls, who though
one, fulfills the desires of many ; the wise who perceive Him
residing in the Self, to them belongs eternal peace, not
to others.

The passage distinguishes the eternal and changeless
nature of the ,Atman from the transient nature
of the world, adding that only those are saved who
know the Atman, since that is the only true know-
ledge. All others who wiU hold fast to the sense
of " plurality," taking the fleeting shadows for eter-
nal realities, will never find rest and peace but will
ever be rolling to and fro, confused and puzzled.

The Svetasvatara Up., composed still later and
tinged with rather sectarian ideas, speaks of the
whole cosmic illusion as capable of being removed
(vilva-maya-nivrttih) by a true knowledge of the
one God Hara (i. lo). Again in iii. 8 it is said
that there is no other way of conquering death
except by knowing the ever-luminous Atman. If
the world were real or true, its knowledge could
save people from the clutches of death. In iii. lo
it is said that only they who know the Atman, who
is beyond the Purusa, formless and pure, attain
immortality, aU others for ever plunge into misery.

That the Atman in us is the subject of knowledge
and itself is consequently unknowable is clearly
brought out in —

" sa vetti vedyam na ca tasyasti vetta tam ahur agryam
purusam mahantam."

Svet. Up. iii. 19.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 67

{Trans.)—
He knows what is to be known, but no one knows him ;
they call him the first, the great Purusa.

In vi. 8-12 is a beautiful description of the nature
of the Atman —

" na tasya karyam karanam na vidyate . . . netaresam."
{Trans.) —

There is no effect and no cause of him, no one is seen
like unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as mani-
fold, as inherent, acting as power and knowledge.

There is no master of him in the world, no ruler of him,
not even a sign of him ; he is the cause, the lord of the lords
of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord,

That only god who spontaneously covered himself, like
a spider, with threads drawn from Nature (Pradhana),
grant us the imperishable Brahman.

He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading,
the self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling
in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free
froni qualities.

He is the one ruler of the many who are free from actions,
he who makes the one seed manifold ; the wise who per-
ceive him within their self, to them belongs eternal happi-
ness, not to others.

Svet. Up. vi. 8-12.

An examination of the other Upanisads also wiU
bear out that the conception of the sole Reality of
Brahman is not missing in them. In some it is
more strongly emphasized, in others it is clouded
over by more reaUstic tendencies. This extreme
idealism which refused to grant reality to the world
seemed to be rather too advanced for the ordinary
tmderstanding, which could not reconcile the fact

68 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

that the world was there somehow or other and it
could therefore not be explained away by being
called " unreal." The inherent empirical tendencies
of our nature are too strong to be wholly conquered ;
howsoever they may be subdued, they still rise up
at some time and refuse to harmonize with the
metaphysical standpoint. Moreover, to the major-
ity who are not given to step beyond the boun-
daries of empirical understanding such metaphysical
speculations as are contained in the pure idealism
of Yajnavalkya seem hardly to convey any meaning.
Yet these minds are not totally to be ignored by
the old sages, they must then make room for some
concession to the empirical consciousness which
refuses to part with the idea of the reality of the
world. This could be done by granting the existence
of the world and yet maintaining at the same time
that the sole reality is the Atman. This was a sort
of degeneration of IdeaUsm into Pantheism, with
its doctrine " AU this is Brahman " (Chan. iii.
14. I).

It may be observed that even in one and the same
passage both these tendencies are sometimes found
mixed up together. The difference between the
two views is rather subtle. The one — Ideahsm —
maintains that Atman alone is real and nothing
else exists besides it ; while the other — Pantheism —
holds that the world does exist and yet it does not
affect the principle of the sole reality of the Atman,
since it itself is nothing different from the Atman ;

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 69

both are identical, one with the other. The Atman is
called " the reality of this reality " (Satyasya sat-
yam) in Brh. Up. ii. i. 20. It is immanent in the
world and pervades even the minutest particle.
This view is strictly speaking untenable, yet to
satisfy the gross and empirical instincts of human
beings, this is the very idea that finds expression
in the greater part of the Upanisads as a whole.
The idea is chiefly represented by the Chand. Up.
The well-known condensed word tajjalan is signifi-
cant in the following passages from the Sandilya-
vidya, and means : From Brahman is all this bom
(tasmat jayate), into Brahman all this is reabsorbed
(tasmin Uyate), and in Brahman all this breathes
(tasmin aniti), meaning thereby that all-in-all is
Brahman.

" Sarvam khalu idam Brahma
Tajjalan iti santa upasita."

Chand. Up. iii. 14. i.
(Trans.) —
All this is Brahman. Let a man meditate on that as
beginning, ending and breathing in It.

Further on Brahman is called " the all-effecting,
all-wishing, aU-smellfaig, all-tasting, and all this "
(Ibid., iii. 14. 2 and 4).

Again, in the very interesting narration in Prapa-
thaka vi., where Uddalaka teaches his son by means
of the parables of honey (vi. 9), streams- (vi. 10),
a large tree (vi. 11), the nyagrodha tree (vi. 12),
salt (vi. 13), a blind man travelling towards the

70 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

Gandhara (vi. 14), etc., etc., the Atman is spoken
of as penetrating " the all " —

" sa ya eso anima etadatmyam
idam sarvam tat satyam sa atma
tat tvam asi Svetaketo iti."

(Trans.)—
That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has
its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Sve-
taketu, art it.

The following passages speak as eloquently in
the same train of thought —

" Athata Atmadesa Atma eva adhastat
Atma uparistat Atma pascat Atma
purastat . . . Atma eva idam
sarvam iti."

Chand. Up. vii. 25. 2.

{Trans.) —
Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left — Self is
all this.

" esa vai visvarupa atma vaisvanarah."

Chand. Up. v. 13. r.
i.e.,
The Self which you meditate on is the Vaisvanara Self,
called Visvarupa.

" ya atma apahatapapma vijaro vimttyur visoko vijighatso-
•pipasah satyakamah satyasamkalpah so 'nvestavyah sa
vijijnasitavyah sa sarvans ca lokan apnoti sarvansca
kaman yas tam atmanam anuvidya vijanatiti ha prajapatir
uvaca."

Chand. Up. viii. 7. i.
Also viii. 7. 3.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 71

{Trans.) —
Prajapati said : " The Self which is free from sin, freed
from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst,
which desires nothing but what is to be desired, imagines
nothing but what is to be imagined, that it is which we
must search out, that it is which we must try to understand.
He who has searched out that Self and has understood it
obtains all worlds and all desires."

" Sarvam evedam avam bhagava atmanam pasyava aloma-
bhya anakhebhyah pratirupam iti."

Chand. Up. viii. 8. i.
{Trans.) —
We both see the Self thus All, a representation even to
the very hairs and nails.

We only say that the Chan. Up. may be taken to
be the chief representative of this stage of thought.
It of course is found in almost aU the other Upani-
sads as well, and contributes the largest bulk of the
whole Aupanisadic literature. Even the Brh. Up.,
which we have taken to be the chief exponent of
pure idealism, contains many passages agreeing with
the pantheistic conception.

" Brahma tarn paradat yo anyatra atmano Brahma
veda . . . sarvam yad ay am atma."

Bfh. Up. ii. 4. 6. Cf. Ibid. iv. 5. 7.

" Brahmaivedam sarvam." — Byh. Up. ii. 5. 2.

" Brahmaitat sarvam." — Ibid. v. 3. i.

i.e..
All this is Brahman.

" Ayam va atma sarvesam bhutanam lokah."

Bfii. Up. I. 4. 16.
i.e..
This Atman is the support of aU creatures.

72 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

" tad yatha rathanabhau ca . . . samarpitah."

Brh. ii. 5. 15.
(Trans.) —
And as all spokes are contained in the axle and in the
felly of a wheel, all beings and all those selves are contained
in that Self.

" Yah sarvesu bhiitesu tisthan . . . amrtah." — Ibid. iii.
7. 15. ' "

He who dwells in all beings, and within all beings, whom
all beings do not know, whose body all beings are, and who
rules all beings within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
" Immortal."

" Attnani eva atmanam pasyati sarvam atmanam
pasyati." Brh. iv. 4. 23.

The Taittir. Up. too says —

?;!?," Om iti Brahma, Om iti idam sarvam."

Taitt. i. 8. i.

The Katha Up. too has the following —

" tasminl lokah sritah sarve."

Katha ii. 5. 8. Cf. ii. 6. i.

That the one Atman, like the fire, the air and
the sun, assumes manifold forms, forms the subject
matter of Katha ii. 5. 8-12.

Even the Svetasvatara Up., which is fundamen-
tally theistic, contains passages like the following —

" sarvavyapinam atmanam," etc.

Svet. i. 16.
" sarvananasirogrivah . . . sivah."

Ibid. ii. iiv
" sarvatah panipadam . . . tisthati."

Ibid. ii. 16.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 73

A mantra from the Purusa-sukta of the R.V.
is quoted as ii. 15 —

" Purusa evedam sarvam," etc.

" visvasya ekam parivest.itaram . . . eti."

iv. 14 (Cf. iv. 16 and v. 13.)
" eko devah sarvabhutesu gudhah . . atma."

vi II,
" Isavasyam idam sarvam . . . jagat."

isa. I
" Yas tu sarvani . . . vijugupsate."

Isa. 6.
" Yasmin . . anupasyatah."

Isa. 7
" Yasmin dyauh . . . setuh."

Mund. ii. 2. 5
" Brahmaivedam . . . varistham."

Mund. ii. 2. 11
" Sarvam . . . catuspat."

Mand. 2.

It is not our object, however, to collect all such
passages here. To multiply such instances is in
no way difficult. One has only to turn over the
pages of the Upanisads and passages tinged with
this idea are sure to be found. For want of a better
word we have named this conception " Panthe-
ism." The reason why the largest portion of the
Upanisads is pantheistic in this sense is twofold.
In the first place, it is not too abstruse to escape the
understanding of those who take some pains to
inquire into the knowledge of the Atman. By not
d enying the existence of the wor l^i it e^ri^?. nnt
arniT;p thp Jipcitili ty nj opposition of the genera l
thinker. Se condly, it is not far from the real truth

74 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

as given in the " pure idealism," e.g., that of Yajna-
valkya. Granting as it does " a world," it boldly
says that " All is the Atman," that the only reality
is the Atman, even though the world may be taken
to possess some kind of existence.

In this way for accommodating the real truth of
the sole reality of the Atman (and consequently
the falsity of the world) to the empirical conscious-
ness which refuses to part with the grosser concep-
tion of the world — an idea with which it has long
been familiar — the idealist has to come down from
his high pedestal and speak in words intelligible
to people in general. He will, for the time being,
grant that there is a world, but will add that " what-
ever is is the Atman." If we analyse this form of
Pantheism, we find that it is not far removed from
the originalldealism, since the oneness of the Atman
is stiU maintained and aU this diversity in the world
is said to be only a name depending on the Atman
for its existence ; and as the name is rmreal, it fol-
lows that even this doctrine indirectly comes to the
same truth. But a further abuse of the doctrine
reduces it to what we may call " the lower Panthe-
ism," according to which each and every " ma-
terial " thing is also the Atman, the horse is the
Atman, the rider is the Atman, the table is the
Atman, etc., so that when a man kills a snake " the
Atman has killed the Atman " would be the vulgar
way of expression ; and losing sight of the original
idea on which this conception is based, it is liable

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 75

to be laughed at and pooh-poohed by the man in
the street. But we must carefully note that this
sort of Pantheism is not the essential doctrine of
the Upanisads. It rests on a mere misunderstand-
ing of the position, which implies that all is the
Atman, since nothing can exist (or have a sattd)
independent of the Atman. When one has realized
the true nature of the Atman, e.g., a man who is
called jivanmukta, he does not see anything besides
the Atman. So long as he has his body, he is within
the world of imperfections and he, too, has to make
some concession in saying that this world (which
really does not exist in his view) too is not anything
besides the Atman. Such a man, being quite
intoxicated with the true bliss {dnanda) of the
Atman, wiU meet aU questions by the word " At-
man." Others who are still ignorant of their blind-
ness deny that they are blind and consequently
laugh at the spontaneous utterings of such a
Vedantist.

As a matter of fact, there is a strange anomaly
in such a knowledge of the Atman. The human
intellect is not made to grasp the reality by its power
of reason and by use of words. ^ There are limita-
tions and imperfections inherent in it. It breaks
down the moment it attempts to go beyond a certain
point, its legitimate boundary. The ultimate reality
refuses to be chopped up into bits in order to

^ Cf. " naisa tarkena matir apaneya " — " this knowledge
cannot be reached by mere reasoning." — KathaUp. i. 2, 9.

76 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

fit in witli the import of language. It is self-
illuminating, and to yield its meaning it demands
our self-consciousness, our living will, oUr whole self,
our whole life, but not our speech, which is after
all inadequate.

In order ftdly to realize such truths the intellect
must transcend itself, which it cannot do. Hence
it has to be content with its blurred and indistinct
vision.^ But, on the other hand, words have to be
used for communicating truth, though the moment
we use them we land ourselves on quicksands.
When we say, e.g., " the world is nothing but an
appearance," even so we use the term " world,"
and in so doing do suppose it to exist. Hence, in
the interpretation of the passages of the Upanisads
we must always confine our attention to the spirit
underlying the text and to the motives which led
the sages to unite various standpoints in one text,
which may seem to be conflicting if looked at merely
in the external.

The degeneration of Pure Idealism — the kernel
of the Upanisads — did not stop here. It went so
far as to turn into ultra-Reahsm and further on
even into Atheism, Deism, etc. The natural course
for Pantheism was to turn into what we may call
Creationism (Cosmogonism). The identity of the
Atman and the world, though granted, was yet far

1 On the function of the intellect compaxe the brilliant
remarks of Prof. Bergson in his UEvolution Creatrice.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION ^^

from being transparent to many who had a craze
for the concrete. They would argue thus : " The
Atman is One, and the world is ' the Many ' ; how
then could the Atman be one with the world ? "
The notion of identity, therefore, not being trans-
parent, lost its force, and was supplanted by a still
more empirical conception, viz., that of causality,
according to which the Atman is the cause and the
world proceeds from it as an effect. This stage of
thought prominently appears in Taitt. Up. ; in this
the chief passages are —

" Tasmat etasmad va atmanah . . . purusah."

Taitt. ii. i. i.
" So 'kamayata bahu syam . . . tat s^stva tad evanu-

pravisat." Ibid. ii. 6.

" Yato va imani bhiitani . . . tad Brahmeti,."

Ibid. iii. i.
" Sa iman lokan asfjata."

Ait. Up. i. 2.

Such ideas are also found scattered over almost
all the other Upanisads.^ The most eloquent pas-
sage on the subject is the analogy of the spider and
the sparks. Just as the spider goes forth from itself
by means of its threads, as from the fire the tiny
sparks fly out, so from this Atman all the spirits of

1 Cf. for example, Brh. i. 2. 5. (tena Atmana sarvam idam
asrjata "), i. 4. i, i. 4. 5, i. 4. 10, ii. i. 20 ; Chan. iii. 19. i,
vi. 2. I, vi. 3. 2, vi. 3. 3. vii. 26. i (" atmatal;i eva idam
sarvam ") ; Mund. i. i. 7, ii. i. i, ii. I. 4, ii. i. 9 ; Mandiikya
6 ; 12.

78 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

life spring forth, all worlds, aU gods, aU living beings
(Brh. ii. i. 20). The same illustrations are further
set out at length in Mund. Up. i. i. 7 and ii. i. i.

The one notable point in this connexion is that
at this stage the Atman who creates the world is
identical with that who lives in it.^ Brahman is
the Atman. The universal Self, the creator of the
world, is not different from the individual Self within
each of us. BraJmaan is thus the psychic principle.
It is not in any way divided into so many Atmans,
but is present as a whole within each of us. It is
not an aggregate of the Atmans but the whole of the
Atman. The well-known Vedantic formulas " tat
tvam asi," " That art thou " (Chand. Up. vi. 8. 7),
and " aham brahmasmi," " I am Brahman " (Brh. i.
4. 10), amply corroborate the idea. We have already
referred to a passage (Brh. iii. 4, and iii. 5), where the
inquiry as to the " Brahman that is within all as
soul " is answered as — " It is thy soul that is within
aU," which as the knowing subject is itself unknow-
able.

Keeping in view the remoteness of the age when
the authors of the Upanisads breathed on this earth,
it strikes us as something really wonderful to grasp
this relation of identity between God and man so
clearly as they did. This is a thought that will ever
be one of the fundamental postulates of all future
metaphysics. The same has been discovered in

1 Cf. above, e.g., " Tat s^stva tad eva anupravisat." —
Taitt. Up. ii. 6. "

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 79

rather a circuitous way long after by Western thinkers
as well, and we believe that in spite of all the threats
of materialistic, atheistic and pragmatistic move-
ments the present century witnesses here and there,
or other destructive tendencies that the future may
witness, this one principle of the identity of the At-
man with the Absolute wiU ever remain unshaken.
Take away this principle and you destroy all meta-
physics worth the name.

Now, the adaptation of the higher truth to the
empirical understanding went stiU further. This
identity of the creative principle with our inner self
was not so attractive to the hard-headed men accus-
tomed to look always to the external. They failed
to understand how the great and infinite Brahman
who created the world could be the same as the httle
Atman within us of the size of a thumb (angustha-
matrah). " Oh," they would say, " the proclaimed
identity is not true, it is meaningless to us ; even if
it be true, it is beyond us to understand it." This
necessitated a further concession to suit the innate
empirical tendencies of such people — in fact, all of
us as rnen do have such tendencies, and our inefficient
intellect fails to grasp this higher truth — and it was
held that the Atman who creates the world may be
distinguished from that who is within us. The former
was called the Paramdtman (the Great Atman) or
the Isvara (the Governor), and the latter, the
Jlvdtman (the individual Atman). Cosmogonism
thus paved the way to Theism. The distinction

8o THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

between the two Atmans begins to appear in the
Kathaka Up., and continues in some of the later
Upanisads. Even as early as in the Brh. Up. some
tendencies towards this position are noticeable : —

" At the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gargi,
sun and moon are held asunder," etc.

Brh. ifi. 8. 9.
" Here within the heart is a cavity, therein he dwells,
the lord of the Universe, the governor of the Universe,
the chief of the Universe ; he is the bridge that holds
asunder these worlds, and prevents them from clashing
together."

Brh. iv. 4. 22.

This is not yet Theism, but a preparation to it.
Real Theism begins with a contrast between Brah-
man and the individual Self. This first appears in
the Katha Up., where the distinction between these
two Atmans is likened to that between light and
shadow —

" Rtam pibantau sukrtasya loke
guham pravistau parame parardhe
chayatapau brahmavido vadanti
pailcagnayo ye ca trinaciketah."

Katha i. 3. i.
(Trans.) —
The two, enjoying the fruits of their good deeds, being
lodged in the cavity of the seat of the Supreme, the knowers
of Brahman call shadow and light, as also do those who main-
tain iive fires and have thrice propitiated the Naciketa
fire." ■ Katha i. 3. i.

The chief exponent at this level of thought is the
Svetasvatara Up., in which though the original

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 8i

identity of Brahman and the individual Atman is
not denied, yet a distinction is clearly drawn out,
e.g., in the following chief passage —

" Ajam ekam lohita^uklakrsnapi
bahvih prajah si-jamanam sarupah,
ajo hy eko jusamano 'nusete
jahaty enam bhuktabhogam ajo 'nyah.

" dva suparna sayuja sakhaya
samanam vrksam parisasvajate,
tayor anyah pippalam svadv atti
anasnann anyo 'bhicakasiti.

" samane vrkse puruso nimagnah
anKaya socati muhyamanah,
justam yada pasyaty anyam isam
asya mahimanam iti vitasokah."

Svet. Up. iv. 5, 6, 7.

Passages exhibiting a Pantheistic and Idealistic
trend of thought are not wanting in this Up. also.
These stages are set down side by side to suit the
variety of human understanding.^ The type of
theism we have indicated here, viz., that which
makes Brahman a personal god and distinguishes
Him from the individual soul, is perhaps most accept-
able to the masses, but we do not hesitate to call
Theism a lower conception than the Pure Idealism
sketched above, we call it a mere pictorial way of

^ In Svet. Up. i. 6, the distinction spoken of above is
explained as illusory. The theistic tinge comes in when it
is said that the removal of this illusion depends on the grace
of the Lord.

82 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

representing a truth in a more concrete and simple
way to let it harmonize with the common understand-
ing, repulsed by " abstract " truths. These people
want some concrete idea, which will give a colouring
to their imagination whenever they venture to think
about the origin of the world in which they live and
move, and it is Theism which they will welcome
instinctively.

But how long and how far could such a separa-
tion between the Lord (Isvara) and the soul exist ?
The natural consequence was a further degeneration,
which in a clever way solved the dualism by striking
out one of its components, viz. , the former. One had
to give way, and the empirical instinct in man would
rather beheve in the existence of the soul than of
the Isvara, which seemed more remote and was not
witnessed by the soul. In this struggle therefore
the conception of the Paramatman was ousted.
There remained only the individual soul (named
now the Purusa) and the external " real " world
(called the Prakrti). This is known as the Sankhya
standpoint, and may be called Atheism for want of a
better word. It may also be added very briefly
that the progressive realism further manifested itself
in two more aspects.

The first was the denial even of the individual
soul. The existence of the world could not be denied,
since it is perceived ; but one could doubt the reality
of the soul. Let us call those who did so " Apsych-
ists." This denial of the soul and the beUef in an

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 83

external world only, which was more or less a stream
of perceptions, changing and momentary, found its
place in Buddhism. The second aspect was the
furthermost degeneration into gross materialism,
which would even rob Buddhism of all idealistic
leanings (or tendency). Only matter exists, and
what is called mind is a mere product of it. Percep-
tion is the only way to knowledge, and all else is
unreal. Such thoughts constituted the School of
Carvaka.

Here we may stop so far as the degeneration of the
Pure Idealism is concerned ; it was impossible for
this degeneration to go further than the Carvakas,
who are regarded as the extreme realists of Indian
philosophy.

The short account we have sketched above on this
subject may perhaps seem to be a digression from
our subject proper, but even if so, it is quite in-
tentional, since we believe that it may help to
present our Idealism in its relation to other stages of
thought, most of which are themselves found in the
Upanisads. So long as these are not viewed in their
mutual relation and coherence, it is not to be won-
dered that one may accuse the Upanisads of mani-
fest contradictions. But a general view of the way
in which the Ipasic truth of the Upanisads, the doc-
trine of the sole reality of Brahman, degenerated,
or " developed " from another standpoint, into the
more realistic stages of thought in order to adapt
itself to the empirical tendencies innate in all of

84 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

us may bring home to us a better idea of the teach-
ings of these treatises in general, and of the place of
the pure Idealism (which may otherwise be named
as the conception of Maya) in Indian thought as a
whole.

We shall presently see how the great Sankara
synthesises all these forms of thought into a single
whole, in which each has a proper place beside the
other, and how he saves the Pure Idealism by the
help of the Sruti as weU as reason. But we must not
anticipate him. Before we discuss his Advaitism
and what he has to say on the theory of Maya, we
have to refer to the philosophy of another great
Advaitist, Gaudapdda. This name is in no way to be
identified with the author of a commentary on
Isvara Krsna's Sankhya Karika.^ The Advaitist
Gaudapada was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher
of Sankara. He has left to us one of the most won-
derful expositions of the fundamentals of Advaitism,
called " Karikas on the Mandiikya Upanisad."

I On this point compare the views of Deussen, System
des Veddnta, p. 26 ; Gaxbe, Sdnkhya-Philosophie, p. 61 ;
Weber, Ah. Vorl., Zweite Auflage, pp. 178, 254, 260 ; Hall,
Contributions towards an Index, p. 86 ; Gough, Philosophy
of the Upanisads, p. 240 ; Max Miiller, Six Systems of
Indian Philosophy, p. 292 ; Colebrooke, Miscellaneous
Essays, 1837, vol. i., p. 95, 104, 233 ; Wilson, Text and
English Translation of the Sdnhhya-Kdriha, p. 257 ; Windi-
schmann, Sankara, Bonn, 1830, p. 85, etc.

I am indebted for these references to Max Walleser's
Der dltere Veddnta, Heidelberg, 1910, p. i.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 85

The nature of our subject requires us to examine
this work in some detail, instead of simply
speaking of it as such. The Karika is divided
into four parts, and as already observed, each of
these is looked upon as having the authority of an
Upanisad. The four parts are named : Agama,
Vaitathya, Advaita and Aldtasdnti. Th^ first, which
in its subject-matter is chiefly based on the Man-
dukya Up., discusses the nature and significance of the
secret syllable " Om," and as it hangs mainly on the
Sruti or the Agama (i.e., the Veda) it is called
AganM. The second explains by means of argument
how the world, characterized as it is by duality, is
false (vaitathya), hence it is named Vaitathya.
In the third are refuted the accusations against the
Advaita view and then the real standpoint is main-
tained by reason ; hence it is called Advaita. In
the fourth are refuted all the arguments which, while
attacking Advaitism, themselves prove contradic-
tory ; and then a calm is restored and the final
word is spoken on the sole reality of the Atman and
the falsity of all else. This part is therefore aptly
termed Aldta-sdnti, which means the extinction of a
firebrand. As a stick burning at one end is waved
round quickly in the air, it seems to create a circle
of fire (alata-cakra), which does not really exist, so it
is with the multiplicity only appearing but not exist-
ing really. ^ The example may sound rather unfamiliar
to Western ears, but it must not be forgotten that it
appeals most vividly to the Indian. The sport

86 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

known as Aldta-cakra is a very common sight in the
streets, where little boys play in the evening after
having finished their daily school-task.

The first part, as already remarked, being based
on the Upanisad, Gauclapada could give an unchecked
flight to his thoughts only in the other three parts.
These are therefore more important for our purpose.
We here give a brief summary of the Advaitism of
this great teacher, which is permeated with the con-
ception of " Maya."

Boldly and truly Gaudapada asserts the world does
not exist in reality ; hence this Maya cannot be
literally removed or destroyed even. All this is
mere appearance, in sooth it is " Advaita." In other
words, the metaphysical truth is that the world does
not exist, the multiphcity is false, hence being not a
reality it does not stand in need of removal (i. 17).
Nobody ever made " may a " ; it is not a reaUty,
hence it is meaningless to speak of it as " to be re-
moved." When the highest truth is realized the
illusion itself is destroyed (i. 18).

In the second part Gaudiapada explains the un-
reality (vaitathya) of aU midtiphcity by showing
that the world which people call real is no more real
than a dream-world. The two worlds are alike in
this respect, the only difference is that the waking-
world is external, while the dream-world is internal.
But as witnessed by the same self they are the same,
both being within the body in a subtle form (ii. i).
Sankara explains this stajiza logically thus —

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 87

Proposition {pratijnaj —

Objects seen in the waMng world are unreal,
(jagraddrsyanam bhavanam vaitathyam.)
Reason (hetu) :

Because they are capable of being seen,
(d rsyamanatvat. )
Illustration (drstdnia) :

Like the objects seen in a dream,
(svapnad rsyabhavavat. )
Argument {hetupanaya) :

As in a dream the objects seen are false, so too in
waking, their capability of being seen is the same.
(Yatha tatra svapne drsyanam bhavanam vai-
tathyam tatha jagarite 'pi dfsyatvam avisistam iti.)
Conclusion {nigamana) :

Therefore in the waking condition too they (the
objects seen) are false (tasmaj jagarite 'pi vaitath-
yam smi'tam iti).

Though, on account of being internal and in a
subtle condition, the phenomena of dream are differ-
ent from those of waking, yet (the fact remains) that
their being seen {dfsyamanatva) and their consequent
futility (or falsity, vaitathya) of presentation, are
common to both. In ii. 5 the same is finally enun-
ciated.

From an analysis of our experience we find that
what is naught at the beginning and end is neces-
sarily so at the middle too. For instance, the
mirage is nothing in the beginning, since it never
was a mirage, so too it is nothing at the end, since
it never existed ; hence it could not have any
tertiary existence. The objects of our waking ex-
perience are finally of the same class as the mirage,

88 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

hence possess no independent existence whatever.
It is only the ignorant, says Sankara, who regard
the image in the glass as real (ii. 6). But it may be
objected that the two phenomena in question are
not quite similar, consequently to deduce the futility
of either from its similarity to the other is not valid.
The objects seen in dreams are not copies of those
seen in the waking condition. In dreams one is not
always having experience in harmony with the objects
of sense, but sees objects transcending the limits of
experience. For instance, one sees objects which are
never found in the waking condition and has strange
experiences, such as finding oneself with eight hands
sitting on an elephant with four heads, and so forth.
All these are not copies of anything unreal, hence
they are real in themselves. But it may be repUed
that aU this rests on a misunderstanding. That
which is supposed to transcend the limits of experi-
ence in dreams is not an absolute reality in itself but
only a condition of the cogniser conditioned by that
state. As those living in heaven, such as Indra
and others, have a thousand eyes, etc., by the very
conditions of their existence, so the transcending of
the limits of experience is the very condition of the
cogniser in dreams. Hence, as the rope, the serpent,
the mir3.ge, etc., being merely the conditions of the
cogniser, are unreal, so the transcendent phenomena
of dreams are only a result of the condition of the
cogniser, and, therefore, unreal ^ (ii. 8). Further,
1 See Dvivedi, Mandukya Upanisad, etc., trans, p. 42.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 89

it must be noted that it is only from a relative stand-
point that dreams are spoken of as unreal and the
waking condition as real. Truly speaking, both are
unreal. Even as to the phenomena in dreams, though
the whole of them are known to be unreal, none the
less the facts arrange themselves imder reality and
unreality (ii. 9. 10).

Now, if the whole of our experience in both the
waking and the dreaming conditiops is pronounced
to be an illusion, well might an objector come for-
ward to say — " Who is then the knower or creator of
experience ? " (ii. 11). If you say " none " you at
once destroy the reality of the Atman, which would
be laying an axe at the very foot of all Vedanta, since
the conception of the reality of the Atman is the very
life of it.

The Atman, we reply, is the cogniser of experi-
ence. He is himself the cogniser and the cognised.
He imagines himself by himself, i.e., brings about the
variety of experience by himself. It all subsists
also in himself through the power of Maya. This
is the last word of the Vedanta on this subject (ii.
12).

Our waking experiences are as much an illusion as
those of dreams. For the phenomena of dreams are
for the time as real as those of waking. The differ-
ence is not in the nature of any of these experiences
as such ; it is caused only by the instruments of
cognition (ii. 15).

The Atman is the only reality. As the rope, whose

go THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

nature is not known as such at that time, is imagined
in the dark to be a snake, a Hne of water, a stick, or
any one of numerous similar things, so is the Atman
imagined to be the variety of experience, Jlva,
Prdna, etc. (ii. 17). All illusion vanishes when a
complete knowledge of the rope is attained, such
knowledge persisting for all time. So too is con-
firmed the right knowledge that all is one, viz., the
Atman (ii. 12). It is only the power of illusion
which makes us imagine the Atman as the variety
of numberless visible objects (ii. 19).

As dream and illusion are entirely unreal, though
actually perceived, so is the cosmos an illusion, an
unreality, though experienced as real. Only the
ignorant regard such illusions as real. The Scrip-
tural texts amply set forth the unreality of the cos-
mos (ii. 31) . The absolute truth is that there is, as a
matter of fact, no dissolution, no creation, none in
bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of liberation,
none liberated. In other words, when it is estab-
lished that the Atman alone is real and all duality is
an illusion, it follows that all that forms the subject
of experience, whether derived from ordinary inter-
course or from sacred texts, is mere illusion. In the
absolute sense of the word, therefore, " Destruction "
is impossible. So too creation, etc. (ii. 32). The
Atman is ever free from aU imaginations and is never
in relation to any conditions. He is the negation of
the phenomenal, because of his essential nature of
unity. But only the sages, free from attachment,

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 91

fear, anger, and well versed in the Scriptures, are
able to perceive this truth (ii. 35).

Having realized the Atman, the wise man should
be in the world like a block of inert matter, i.e.,
being perfectly unmoved and unattached to the
duality. In this way, though still being within the
world, he wiU transcend it ; from the point of view
of this world therefore, he will be a sort of block of
dead matter (ii. 36). This consciousness of the self-
realization of the Atman should never cease (ii. 38).

The third part (" Advaita ") begins with the idea
that the Atman, though appearing to give birth to
the multiplicity of things all about us, is not in the
least affected by any such thing (iii. 2) . Multiplicity
is only due to self-imposed and imagined limitations.
The individuation of the Atman into the Jivas is
not a process of division. The division appears as
real. For instance, the Atman, being indivisible
andaU-pervading, maybe compared to ether (akasa).
It is not different from the ether enclosed in a jar ;
the enclosure being destroyed, the limited dkdsa
merges into mahakdsa. So is Jiva merged in the
Atman on the dissolution of the self-imposed ad-
juncts ^ (iii. 3. 4). Differences are only in form,
capacity, name, etc., but that does not imply any
real difference in dkdsa itself. This illustration may
fully apply to Jiva (iii. 6). As, again, dkdsa inter-
cepted by a " jar " is neither a part nor an evolved

1 On this compare Sankara on ii. i. 14 below.

92 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

effect of akasa, so is Jiva neither a part nor an evolved
effect of the Atman (iii. 7).

The Sastras praise the unity of the Atman, demon-
strated by reason and borne out by Scriptures,
while they censure manifoldness or separateness.
The separation between JIva and the Atman is only
assumed and need only be taken in a metaphysical
sense (iii. 13. 14). Again, the distinctionless Atman,
eternal and unborn, appears with distinctness under
so many finite and mortal forms simply through
maya ; for, if the distinctions were real, the immortal
would in that case necessarily become mortal, which
on the very face of it is impossible, since a thing can-
not be changed into anything of quite an opposite
nature (iii. 19. 21).

The Atman is ever unborn and one. It does not
convert itself into the world of experience. If it
did, it would go on taking birth after birth ad
infinitum, thus precluding all possibiUty of libera-
tion. The birth of worlds is possible only through
maya. Nothing can be actually born of the Atman.
It may only be supposed to give birth to things,
like the rope to the snake, etc., but not in reahty
(iii. 27).

Again, Asat (non-existence), cannot be taken as
the cause or source of everything. The son of a
barren women is a concept without meaning, never
to be realized in reality or even in illusion (iii. 28).
All duality is nothing but a creation of the mind,
since it stands or falls with the mind (iii. 31).

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 93

The iouTth. part, called Alata-idnti, i.e., "Quench-
ing the Fire-brand," is the final pronouncement of
Gaudapada, which is intended to destroy the illu-
sion of the " fire-brand." The relation between
cause and effect is examined, and it is shown how it
breaks down while applying to the Atman (iv. 11-
19) . Nothing is produced either of itself or by some-
thing else, nor, in fact, is anything produced, whether
it be being, non-being, or both (iv. 22). The vari-
ous theories held by the Vijnanavadins, the Nihilists,
etc., are false (iv. 28). Those who maintain the
reality of the world must not forget to realize that
the world, being without a beginning, cannot, in
reason, be shown to have an end. Nothing which
is beginningless is non-eternal. So also is it impossi-
ble to prove the eternity of salvation, realized only
at the moment of its knowledge, and therefore hav-
ing a beginning (iv. 30). That which is naught at
the beginning and at the end, cannot exist in the
present ; objects are all like ordinary illusions,
though regarded as real (iv. 31).

Thought — all-peace and one, the ever-unborn,
immovable and immaterial, appears as admitting of
creative motion and material existence. Sat is
unborn and eternal, still it appears to pass into birth,
etc. (iv. 45) . Thus neither is the mind produced nor
are the objects ; those who know this are never
deluded into a false consciousness (iv. 46) . As motion
makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, etc., so
motion makes thought appear as perceiver, perceived

94 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

and the like (iv. 47). The fire-brand is not itself
affected by its appearance and is ever unborn, its
motion being unreal ; so is thought unaffected by
appearance, and is ever unborn, its apparent motion
being an illusion (iv. 48). The appearances of the
fire-brand in motion are not brought into it from with-
out ; and they do not appear in any other place
when it is at rest, though they do not appear to enter
it (iv. 49). The same applies, to thought. When
thought is in motion like the fire-brand, appearances
do not come from without ; also they do not go
out anywhere beyond the motion, neither do they
enter thought. They are always indescribable
because of their defiance to the relation of cause and
effect (iv. 51-52) . So long as one has faith in causal-
ity, one sees the world eternally present ; this faith
being destroyed, the world is nowhere (iv. 56).
Duality consisting of subject and object is a crea-
tion of the external senses (iv. 87). Those who
always hold fast to " duality " never perceive the
truth (iv. 94). The treatise ends with a salutation
to the Absolute after having realized it, such an
attitude being justified from the standpoint or
relativity and experience (iv. 100).

In this brief survey we have attempted to show
how the sage Gaudapada establishes a thorough-
going monist's position, calling the whole world of
experience as false as the dream-world, analysing
the notions of existence and reality, refuting the
idea of causality, and even giving a psychological

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 95

genesis of appearances. The conception of Maya
was by him developed into a more or less systematic
whole, which was afterwards still further elaborated
by Sahkara. The general sketch we have here given
of Gaudapada's idealism will suffice for our purpose,
and without dwelling on it any more we now pass
on to the final S3mthesis of the doctrine in Sarikara.
In passing, it may be observed that there is hardly
any teacher of note, between the times of Gauda-
pada and Sarikara, who contributed anything worth
the name to the development of the idea of Maya.
There may perhaps have been some, but unfortun-
ately their names have not come down to us. We
purposely omit in this chapter the discussion of
Badarayana's Sutras for reasons which are not with-
out justification. The SUtras, as they stand apart
from Sankara's commentary or any other exposi-
tion of them, may hardly be said to yield one definite,
fixed and indisputable interpretation, either in
favour of or against any doctrine of the Vedanta.
Sankara, Ramanuja, and many other expositors,
including some of the very modern ones, have res-
pectively attempted to wield the Sutras as weapons
for the defence and support of their own interpreta-
tions and conceptions of the chief metaphysical
problems. None of them is ■prima facie open to
reconciliation with the others. In face of such facts
it would indeed be worth the trouble to go deeply
into the problem, viz., how far can the Sutras as
such be made to give any definite interpretation

96 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

and meaning ? As far as we are aware, nobody has
yet gone into these details, and it would certainly be
no mean subject for further research. Our present
purpose, however, pirecludes us from undertaking
this additional task here, and even if any such sug-
gestions were brought forward, they would not
materially affect the position of the question at
issue. Personally, we are inclined to take Sankara
as the best and the most satisfactory exponent of
Badarayana's views on the Vedanta problems. We
do endorse the view that to Sankara was handed
down the tradition in its genuineness. But dog-
matizing on such points is of no use, and one is at
hberty to hold whatever view one likes on matters
incapable of any direct proof. Hence we now pass
on to a discussion of Sankara's contributions on the
question of Maya.

As an interpreter of the Vedic tradition and the
Vedanta of the Upanisads, Sankara found himself
in a difficult and peculiar situation. He observed,
on the one hand, the different ways of explaining
the problem of Reality in these philosophical
treatises : all of them as such could not be taken as
ultimately true. Their seeming contradictions, even
as such, could not be merely ignored. Yet on the
other hand, all these were to him Vaidic (i.e., based
on the Sruti), and hence revelations of the Divine
Truth, which by the force of his tradition he had to
accept. He noticed, e.g., that the purely meta-
physical standpoint of Yajnavalkya was at any

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 97

rate quite incompatible with the less advanced views
— the later stages in the degeneration of pure Ideal-
ism, which we have briefly described above — and
yet each of these phases of thought claimed validity
on the basis of a certain Sruti. He was thus in a
way on the horns of a dilemma, frorn which he found
an escape with caution and wisdom, acting quite in
the spirit of aU great " sjmthesisers " of thought.
In attaining such syntheses, sometimes a clean sweep
has to be made, and Sankara was not wanting in the
courage for this. He asserted that knowledge is of
two kinds : para (higher) and apard (lower), the
former referring to the unqualified Brahman, and
the latter including all else ; that is to say, para vidya
means only the highest metaphysical Vedanta
such as is given in the pure idealism of Yajiiaval-
kya, Gaudapada, etc. The other parts of the
Upanisads, which deal with more realistic or empiri-
cal views, as well as the whole ritual canon of the
Vedas, with its things commanded and forbidden
under promise of reward and punishment in another
world, the Smrtis, etc., are all labelled as apara
vidya. To include the Vedas under this latter head
was certain to offend the masses, yet Sankara took
this course, which was indeed essential for his
synthesis. The thought that the empirical view of
nature is unable to lead us to a final solution of the
being of things, was occupying the central position
in his mind. " More closely examined," as Deussen ^
1 System des Vedanta, chap. ii.

98 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

has so eloquently pointed out, " this thought is
even the root of all metaphysics, so far as without it
no metaphysics can come into being or exist." This
thought is the great d3aiamic force in Sankara,
and it is this that led him to base the whole of his
system — as reflected in the Sarirakabhasya ^ — on the
fundamental concept of the illusory nature of all
our empirical and physical knowledge and the true
nature of the higher metaphysics. That is the
reason why he starts with an examination into the
erroneous transference of the things and relations
of the objective world to the inner soul, the Self,
which leads to the idea of avidya. This thought,
which forms the introduction to his epoch-making
book, in a way gives an idea of his whole system,
and we could not do better than state the whole
position in his own words, which, if well understood,
are sure to furnish a key to Sankara's whole Advait-
ism. Object (visaya) and Subject (visayin), he
says at the beginning of his work, indicated by the
" Thou " (the not-I) and the " I," are of a nature
as opposed as are darkness and hght. If it is certain
that the being of the one is incompatible with the
being of the other, it follows so much the more that
the quaJities of the one also do not exist in the other.
Hence it follows that the transfer (superimposition,

1 In his Introduction he defines it as " atasmin tad-
buddhih," i.e., " supposing a thing to be what it is not
actually.

DEVELOKWENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 99

adhydsa) of the object denoted by the " Thou " and
its qualities to the pure spiritual object indicated by
the " I," and conversely, the transfer of the sub-
ject and its qualities to the object, are logically
false. Yet in mankind this procedure, resting on
a false knowledge pairing together the true and the
untrue, is inborn or natural (naisargika) , so that they
transfer the being and quahties of the one to the
other, not separating object and subject, although
they are absolutely different, and so saj^ing, for
example, " This am I," " That is mine," etc. This
transference thus made the wise term Avidya
(ignorance), and, in contradistinction to it, they call
the accurate determination of the true nature of
things (" the being-in-itself " of things, vastusvaru-
fam) Vidyu (knowledge). If this be so, it follows
that that to which a similar false transfer is thus
made, is not in the slightest degree affected by any
want or excess caused thereby.

All this goes to show that the final reason of the
false empirical concept is to be sought in the nature
of our cognitive faculty, as this passage clearly
brings out the unalterableness of the Self. From
this it may rightly .be inferred " that the ground of
the erroneous empirical concept is to be sought for
solely in the knowing subject ; in this subject the
ttvidya, as repeatedly asserted,^ is innate {nai-

1 Cf. Sankara's Scirirakabh3,sya, Bibl. Ind., p. 10, 1. i,
p. 21. 7, 807. la.

100 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

sargika) ; its cause is a wrong perception ; ^ its being
is a wrong conception. ^

Now we proceed to an examination of some of
the typical passages * in Sankara which sum up his
whole position with respect to Maya.

One of the most important passages, which sums
up Sankara's view, viz.. Brahman alone is the reality
(" Brahmavyatirekena karyajatasyabhavah " *) and
is found in his commentary on ii. i. 14 (" tadanan-
yatvam arambhanasabdadibhyah ") runs thus —

" The effect is this manifold world consisting of
ether and so on ; the cause is the highest Brahman.
Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is
non-different from the cause, i.e., has no existence
apart from the cause. How so ? " On account of
the scriptural word ' origin ' (arambhana ") and
others." The word " arambhana " is used in con-
nexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to
show how through the knowledge of one thing every-
thing is known, viz., Chand. Up. vi. 1.4: " As, O
good one ! by one clod of clay aU that is made of
clay is known, the modification being^^a name merely

1 Cf. Ibid. p. 9. 3. " It is mithya-jilana-nimitta."

• " mithya-pratyaya-rupa," p. 21. 7. See Deussen,
System, ch. ii.

" In going through the whole book, the passages which
appeared to be typical on this point are found in the com-
mentary on i. I. 9, i. I. 20, i. 3. 19, i. 4.3, i. 4. 6, ii. i. 14,
ii. 1. 31, ii. r. 33, ii. 2. 2, ii. 2. 4, ii. 2. 7, ii. 2. 9.

* Veddntasiitras with Sankara's Commentary, Bibl. Ind..
Calcutta, 1863, vol. i. p. 444, 11. 11-12,

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION lOl

which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that
it is clay merely, thus," etc. The meaning of this
passage is, that if there is known a lump of clay
which really and truly is nothing but clay, there are
known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such
as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, aU of which agree in
having clay for their true nature. For these modi-
fications and effects are names only, exist through or
originate from speech only, while in reality there
exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as
they are names (individual effects distinguished by
names) they are untrue ; in so far as they are clay
they are true. This parallel instance is given with
reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase " vdcdr-
ambhana " to the case illustrated by the instance
quoted, we understand that the entire body of
effects has no existence apart from Brahman.
Later on again the text, after having declared that
fire, water and earth are the effects of Brahman,
maintains that the effects of these three elements
have no existence apart from them (Chand. Up. vi.
4. i). Other sacred texts ^ also, whose purpose is to
intimate the unity of the Self, are to be quoted here
in accordance with " the others " of the Sutra. On
any other assumption it would not be possible to
maintain that by the knowledge of one thing every-
thing becomes known. We therefore must adopt

* Cf. Chand. vi. 8. 7 ; vii. 25. 2 ; B^^had. ii. 4. 6 ; iv. 4. 25 ;
Mund. ii. 2. 11.

102 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the following view : — In the same way as those parts
of ethereal space which are limited by jars and water-
pots are not really different from the universal
ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not
really different from the surface of the desert — for
the nature of that water is that it is seen in one
moment and has vanished in the next, and, moreover,
it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i.e.,
apart from the surface of the desert) — ^so this mani-
fold world with its objects of enjo3rment, enjoyers,
etc., has no existence apart from Brahman." ^

A httle further, replying to the pluralists' objec-
tions " that if we acquiesce in the doctrine of abso-
lute unity —

(i) The ordinary means of right knowledge, per-
ception, etc., become invahd, because the
absence of manifoldness deprives them of
their objects ;

(2) All the texts embodying injunctions and pro-

hibitions will lose their purport if the dis-
tinction on which their vaUdity depends
does not really exist ;

(3) The entire body of doctrines which refer to

final release will collapse, if the distinction
of teacher and pupil on which it depends
is not real,"
Sahkara says —

1 Sankara on ii. i. 14, Bibl. /»(?., p. 444-445. See Thi-
baut's Translation, S.B.E., i., p. 320-321. Cf. Deussen,
Die Sutras des Veddnta, p. 281.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 103

" These objections, we reply, do not damage our position,
because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is
considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman
being the Self of all has not arisen ; just as the phantoms of
a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper awakes .
For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge
of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind
that the world of effects with its means and objects of right
knowledge and its results of actions is "untrue ; he rather,
in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects as
forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brah-
man being in reality the Self of all. Hence as long as true
knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why
the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should
not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of
a dreaming man, who in his dream sees manifold things,
and up to the moment of waking is convinced that his ideas
are produced by real perception without suspecting the
perception to be a merely apparent one."

These eloquent passages speak for themselves,
and hardly call for any further discussion. Here
Sankara by making use of appropriate analogies
endorses and develops the same metaphysical truth
as was held by Yajnavalkya, Gaucjapada, etc.
The unity of the Self is the maxim, and it is defended
against the charge of its stopping all possibilities of
activity, exertion, etc., in the world. There are two
other similes used by Sankara in describing the
nature of Brahman, and before we refer to his other
passages let us see what he says in his comments on
ii. I. 9 —

" With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages,
we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the

104 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

effects and its qualities by showing that the latter are the
mere fallacious super-impositions of nescience, and the
very same argument holds good with reference to reab-
sorption also. We can quote other examples in favour of
our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected
by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is
unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the illusory
visions of his dream because they do not accompany
the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep ;
so the one permanent witness of the three states (the
highest Self) is not touched by the mutually exclusive
three states. For that the highest Self appears in those
three states is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the
snake for which the rope is mistaken in the darkness. On
this'poitit teachers'knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta ^
have declared : ' When the individual soul which is held
in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes,
then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-
duality.' " »

We see then that Sankara is very anxious to con-
vince us of the truth of his doctrine, and to explain
it in a picturesque way for the sake of the uninitiated,
makes use of some very appropriate similes, among
which are —

(i) The rope and the snake. ^

(2) The magician or juggler (mayavin) and his

jugglery.

(3) The desert and the mirage.

(4) The dreamer and the dream.

The last of these has been already made use of

1 Ref. Gaudapada.

' Gaudapada, Kariha, i. 16.

» See also Sankara on i. 3. 19.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 105

exhaustively by Gaudapada. It has been shown

that experiences of the waking condition are no less

unreal than those of dream. Both are illusions alike.

Sankara works out the same idea in the passage

quoted above, and only touching upon it briefly

leads us to see that the Atman is not affected in any

way by the assumed existence of the world. If we

just think for a moment about the subject of dreams,

we perceive that we can hold without any fear of

contradiction that —

(i) The dream-state is as real as the waking state

so long as the dream lasts — i.e., so long as

the consciousness to distinguish the dream

as such from the waking condition has not

arisen.^

(2) But as the illusory nature of a dream is deter-

mined only on waking up from the sleep,
which prepared the way for it ; so too on
acquiring a knowledge of the Atman — the
sole reality — ^waking up from the slumber of
ignorance, the truth that the world is an
illusion is clearly perceived.

(3) It is only " relatively " speaking that we say

" the dream-world is unreal " and " the
waking world is real " ; strictly speaking

1 Mr. F. H. Bradley, the well-known author of Appear-
ance and Reality, once told us that there could be no diffi-
culty whatever on speculative grounds in holding this
position. Socrates (in Plato) discussed the same view, and
Tennyson said, " Dreams are true while they last."

io6 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

both are unreal. The difference does not
He in the very nature of things, since the fact
stated above under the first head is indubit-
ably true.
If the ultimate reality is nothing but the One
Atman, how is it that we perceive multipUcity here ?
How do we find so many Jivas ? Are they different
from the Absolute, or are they parts of it, or what ?
What is this differentiation due to ? What is the
principle of individuation ? To all such questions
Sankara answers with the aid of the theory of Maya.
All these differences are only due to the imposition
of name (nama) and form (rupa). Here he says in
the course of his exposition on ii. i. 14 —

" Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the oniniscient
Lord, there are name and form, the creations of Avidyd,
not to be defined either as being Brahman nor different
from it, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal
world, called in Sruti and Smrti the power of Illusion
(maya^aktih) or Prakrti. . . . Thus the Lord depends
as Lord upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the
products of Avidya ; . . . whUe in reality none of these
qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by
right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. ... In this
manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who has
reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent
world does not exist."

Again, on i. 3. 19, refuting the view that the
individual soul is not identical with the Universal,
Sankara remarks —

" Some are of opinion that the individual soul, as such.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 107

is real. To refute all these speculators who obstruct the
way to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this
Sariraka-Sastra has been set forth, whose aim it is to show
that there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging, who
is cognition, and who by means of nescience (avidya) mani-
fests himself in, various ways, just as a juggler appears in
different shapes by means of his magical powers."

The difference of Jiva and Brahman is again set
forth in the same place as being only due to avidya —

■■ avidyakalpitam lokaprasiddham jivabhedam."

Bibl. Ind., p. 269.'

Sankara's greatness as a synthesiser of Advaitism
lay, as we have already remarked, in two things:
first, in the important and useful distinction he drew
between " para " and " apard" vidyd, which gave
a rational explanation of all the so-caUed conflicting
statements in the Vedas, etc. ; secondly, in his
emphasis on the distinction between the empirical
(vyavahariki) and metaphysical (paramarthiki) exist-
ence, which was in some way an improvement
upon Gau4apada. The distinction is implicitly
observed in the Upanisads and in GauQlapada's
Karikas too, but nowhere is it more clearly and em-

1 On the same subject compare pp. 267, 342, 353, 454,
455, 488, 491, 507, 518. In general for the doctrine of Avidya
compare p. 98,1. 8, 112. 3, 182. 12, 185. 12, 199. 5, 205. 10,
343- 4. 360. 2, 433. 13, 452. 2, 455. 4, 473. 17, 483. 6, 507. 1,
660. 10, 680. 12, 682. 3, 689. I, 690. 5, 692. 14, 787. 13,
804. I, 807. II, 837. 2, 860. 15, 1,056. I, 1,132. 10, 1,133.
12. I.I33- 15-

io8 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

phatically brought out than in Sankara. For in-
stance, he remarks on page 488 —

"All empiric action is true, so long as the knowledge of
the Self is not reached, just as the action in dreams before
awaking takes place. As long in fact as the knowledge of
unity with the true Self is not reached, one does not have a
consciousness of the unreality of the procedure connected
with standards and objects of knowledge and fruits of works,
but every creature, under a designation of ' I ' and ' mine,
mistakes mere transformations for the Self and for charac-
teristics of the Self, and on the other hand leaves out of
consideration their original Brahman-Selfhood ; therefore
before the consciousness of identity with Brahman awakens,
all worldly and Vaidic actions are justified." ^

This fact is often ignored, and consequently the
Vedanta is charged with fostering inaction, pessi-
mism, leading finally to a zero-point, etc. Such
objections are simply due to a misunderstanding or
ignorance of passages like these.

With Sankara closes our survey of the doctrine of
Maya. The theory as held to-day is in no way con-
flicting with the views of Sankara. After having
been made the object of polemics from different
quarters, this theory was again revived with full
force and vigour — though it has never been dead in
its influence — ^by modern writers on the Vedanta.
The same ideas of Gaudapada and Sankara were still
further elaborated, though the style of expression

^ The spirit of such passages is exactly analogous to
Kant's axiom that the transcendental ideality of the world
does not exclude its empiric reality.

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 109

became more and more laboured and technical. It is
not the aim of this chapter to enter into the forms in
which it is exhibited in the present day. In all
parts of India are stiU found in large numbers people
who, after having thoroughly studied the various
schools of Indian philosophy, acquire a pectdiar
attachment to the Vedanta, especially to the Advaita
school of Sankara. The doctrine of Maya is the
foundation-stone on which they rear the whole super-
structure of their philosophy of life. The religion of
the cultured Indians in modem times is identical
with their philosophy, which has two aspects :
exoterically, it is monotheistic, with the belief that
the oMeAtman manifests itself in various forms, which
are taken as " means " (sadhanas) or " sjnnbols "
of attaining the Atman — this is the lower aspect of
the two ; esoterically, monotheism has no place to
hold, since it is not the final truth ; the only meta-
physical reality of the Absolute, Sat, Cit and Ananda,
is held to be no other than the Self, and aU exertions
are directed towards realizing this very fact. The
conception of Maya has comforted many a perplexed
mind.

" Ekasyanekamurtitvam
yugapat paramatmanah,
saccidanandarupasya
sidhyen mayam rte katham." 1

1 From an unpublished MS. {Mdydvadadarpana) lately
added to the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

no THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

(Trans.) —
" How is it possible to explain the manifold simultane-
ous manifestations of the Absolute — ^being nothing but
Sat (being), at (intelligence) and ananda (bliss) — ^without
having recourse to Maya ? "

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
WITHIN THE VEDANTA

CHAPTER III

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE WITHIN THE VEDANTA

Among the many objections that have been, from
time to time, urged against the doctrine of Maya,
by Indian thinkers not belonging to Sankara's school
and by various other writers of the East and the
West, most are based on a mere misunderstanding of
the real significance and the correct attitude of the
doctrine, as we propose to show presently. It is
not our purpose here to take into account all such
objections, first, because some of them are merely
childish and destroy themselves in their very enunci-
ation, and secondly, because it falls outside our
scope. We will chiefly discuss those that lie within
the sphere of the Vedanta proper, viz., those that
have been raised by some of the other Vedantic
schools, and shall subsequently weigh briefly the
principal theories commonly held up to-day in order
to rebut the doctrine.

The Vedanta system easUy divides itself into four
schools. These are represented chronologically by
Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, and Vallabha ; and
their four corresponding types of interpretation are

114 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

known as Advaita, Visistadvaita, Dvaita, and
Suddhadvaita. Each of these schools presents a
different type of thought on the problem of the
relation between the Absolute and the Universe,
and each attempts to give its own interpretation of
the principal passages of the Upanisads and of
Badarayana's Siitras to suit its own pre-conceived
plan of ideas.

The existence of these different schools within the
Vedanta needs no apology. It is vain to expect all
the Vedantists to conform to the absolute rational-
istic type of Saiikara, or to the theistic type of
Ramanuja, or to the other types. Variety, which
is no less true of human nature than of the external
world, demanded a variety in the philosophic and
religious beliefs, and such diversity, at least in types
or groups, will ever prevail. It is an idle dream to
expect that at a certain time the world will have one
form of religion, or wiU think in one set groove of
thought. These four schools in the Vedanta repre-
sent four stages of the development of thought,
which carry with them the philosophic and religious
beliefs.

Our whole personality enters into the formation of
our philosophic or religious systems, and each of us
accepts the one and rejects the other in so far as it is in
harmony or otherwise with his cognitive experiences
or general interests. The psychological process of
selection or choice is ever going on in our every-day
life in all its activities. Hence it is not in any way a

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 115

drawback in the Vedanta that it spht itself up into
four systems. This analysis was essential for a
final synthesis.

In tracing the development of the conception of
Maya, we have already described in brief the main
features of Sankara's school. To recapitulate very
briefly, we may add that the whole of it centres round
the theory of Maya. Hence its characteristics may
be simimed up as —

1. That the only true existence is that of Brahman.

2. That Brahman is identical with the Atman.

3. That the universe is Maya, having only a

phenomenal or relative existence.
Max MiiUer seems to have been a little surprised,
judging by his observations on Sankara : " The entire
complex or phenomenal existence is considered as
true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the
Self of all has not arisen, just as the phantoms of a
dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
awakes " (ii. i. 14), and says, " But it is very curi-
ous to find that, though Sankara looks upon the
whole objective world as the result of nescience, he
nevertheless allows it to be real for aU practical pur-
poses (vyavaharartham.") ^ But as we have already
pointed out above, there is nothing to be surprised
at in this conception. That was the only way one
could reconcile the seeming reality of the world with
the idea of the absolute reality. To deprive the

' Max Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, 1899,
p. 202.

ii6 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

world totally of all relative reality, even for practi-
cal purposes, would be to propose a doctrine that
would soon destroy itself, since it will not in any
way explain the problem but wiU simply ignore it.
Moreover, in this respect, Sankara's views were
exactly similar to those of Kant, who appeared on
the world's stage about i,ooo years later. Kant, too,
while strongly inveighing against the Dogmatism
and Scepticism of his times, by a thorough-going
critical analysis of Reason itself cam6 to the inde-
pendent conclusion that the world, quahfied as it is
by Time, Space, and Causality, has no metaphysical
reality, but none the less is an appearance, i.e., is
empirically real. We hold that whatever other
weaknesses there may have been in Kant's system,
his point was true beyond question. Many Hege-
lians of modern times have come forward with a well-
arrayed attack against the fundamental doctrines of
Kant, but unfortimately they have started with
gratuitous premises and consequently their criti-
cisms have mostly missed the mark.^ Kant's
" Things-in-Themselves " seem to them to stand
opposed to phenomena, and so supposing a cleavage
between the two worlds they infer that it is impossi-
ble to bring these two into relation. The same criti-
cism has been preferred against Sankara's conception

1 We refer, e.g., to the works of T. H. Green (see Pro-
legomena to Ethics, ch. i.), Prichard (Kant's Theory of
Knowledge, chap, on "Things-in-Themselves"), and many
Others,

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 117

of Nirguna Brahman (unqualified Absolute, corres-
ponding to Kant's " Noumena " or Schopenhauer's
" Will ") and Saguna Brahman (qualified Absolute,
the Isvara,^ corresponding to Kant's " Phenomena,"
or the Vedantic idea of Maya, or Schopenhauer's
fundamental conception of the unreality of the world,
when he says, " Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung." ) 2

This short digression is meant simply to point out
that Sankara's concession of " phenomenal " reality
was not due to any aberration of his thought, but
quite consonant with even the result of the modern
critical philosophy of Kant and others. The point
has been worked out in some detail by Deussen in
his Elemente der Metaphysik.

As we are now concerned with the examination of
the main objections to the Maya theory, it is need-
less to dwell longer on its constructive side. We now
give a summary of the other three schools in the
Vedanta, before dealing with the objections.

The Ramanujas represent the theistic school of the
Vedanta. They worship Visnu as their Brahman,
in opposition to Sankara's Nirguna Brahman, and,
denying that the deity is void of form or quality,
regard him as endowed with all good and auspicious
qualities, and with a two-fold form : the supreme
spirit (Paramatma, or cause), and the gross one (the

1 The word Isvara is used in a pantheistic sense, such
as would regard the whole world as pervaded by Isvara,
or a manifestation of Him, or His body as it were.

* Cf . Schopenhauer, Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung.

ii8 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

effect, the universe, or matter). Their doctrine is
consequently known as Viiistadvaita, or the doc-
trine of Unity with attributes.^ Madhava = sums
up the tenets of Ramanuja in the formula — " Three
categories are established, as soul, not-soul, and
Lord ; or as subject, object, and Supreme Disposer." '
Ramanuja himself has furnished us with a sum-
mary of his main teachings in the introduction to
his Vedantadipa. He starts with what he calls the
three primary and ultimate certainties known to
philosophy, viz. —

1. God (Hari). Universal Soul, personal, and
intelligent.

2. Soul (cit). Individual, intelligent.

3. Matter (acit). Non-intelligent.

Each of these three entities is distinct from the
other : God, the Supreme Soul of the Universe, is
distinct from the individual soul, which again is
distinct from non-inteUigent matter. This differ-
ence is intrinsic and natural. The relation between
God and the universe (matter and soul) is that of
cause and effect. Matter and soul form the body of
God, which in its subtle condition is the universe in
its causal state, and in its gross condition the created
universe itself. The individual soul enters into

1 See Wilson, Religious Sects of the Hindus, London, 1861,
vol. i., p. 43.

» Cf. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Bibl. Ind., Calc, 1858,
p. 46. ff.

* Cf. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Trans. Cowell and Gough,
1882, p. 56. Deussen, Geschichte der Philosophie, iii., p. 261.

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA .119

matter, and thereby makes it live ; and, similarly,
God enters into matter and soul and gives them their
powers and their peculiar characters. The universe
without God is exactly analogous to mattei; without
soul.^

Brahman (which is identified with Hari in this
system) is regarded as having svagatabheda, i.e.,
differences within itself in its threefold aspects re-
ferred to above. It is imagined to be like a tree,
which, though one, has differences within itself in
the shape of its branches, etc.

Madhva (also known as Anandatirtha and Purna-
prajiia'), in the thirteenth century, proposed an-
other system in the Vedanta, which he called the
Dvaita. It is so called because he believed in the
duality of ultimate principles, which he named the
independent and the dependent. Difference was a
real entity in itself. The relation of the individual
to God, the Supreme Lord, was that of a slave and
master : the latter was the former's object of obedi-
ence. Maya is only the wiU of the Lord (Visnu).
The grace of Visnu is won only through the know-
ledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of
non-duahty. The whole world was manifest from
the body of Visnu. ^

1 Cf. Ramanuja's Sfibhasya, trans. Rangacarya and
Varadaraja, Madras, 1899. " Analytical Outline," p. i.

' See Madhava, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, ch. v.

» " Visnor deMj jagat sarvam avirasit " — Wilson,
Religious Sects, i., p. 144, note.

120 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

Vallabha, the founder of another Vaisnava school
of the Vedanta, flourished in the fifteenth century
and taught a non-ascetic view of religion, deprecat-
ing all kinds of self-mortification, which, he said,
destroyed the body in which there Uves a spark
of the Supreme Spirit. According to him, the high-
est reality was Krsna, exempt from all quahties ^
eternal, self-suf&cient, and the supreme soul of the
world. The creation of the world was by a pro-
cess of evolution' and involution. " Krsna being
alone in the Goloka," as Wilson ^ says, " and medi-
tating on the waste of creation, gave origin to a
being of a female form endowed with the three
gtmas, and thence the primary agent in creation.
This was Prakrti or Maya." This account of Wilson
is too scrappy and vague. As a matter of fact, there
is a very scanty literature on the teachings of Valla-
bha. The Sarvadarsanasamgraha has no place for
it, and even Deussen, following closely the plan of
this book, omits it altogether from his Geschichie
der Philosophie. Max Miiller too is quite silent on
the subject. We shall not give here any detailed
account of VaUabha's doctrines, but we must state
their essentials in so far as they affect the general
conception of Maya.

1 Hence the name of the system as Visuddhddvaita.
VaUabha held that Krsna was devoid of all qualities, while
Ramanuja had alleged before his times that Visnu possessed
all auspicious qualities.

» Religious Sects of the Hindus, vol. i., p. 123.

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 121

Vallabha was preceded in his line of thought by
Nimbarka and Visnuswami. He attempted to purify
the visistadvaita of Ramanuja and others. He
said it was a contradiction in terms to suppose with
Ramanuja that Brahman — all cit, intelligence —
should be in inseparable union with acit (non-intelli-
gent matter, jada) . Brahman is sat, cit, and dnanda ;
exhausts the possibility of all being, and becomes
whatever it wills by the evolution (avirbhava) and
involution (tirobhava) of its properties. Whereas
Saiikara explains the phenomena of the universe by
adhydsa, Ramanuja by quaUtative and inherent
differences in Brahman, Madhva by manifestation
of Brahman's body, Vallabha does so by the process
of evolution and involution of Brahman.

After this very brief summary of the chief doc-
trines of the schools within the Vedanta, we come
to Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of Maya.
This is embodied in his greatest work. The Srlbhdsya,
a commentary on Badarayana's Brahmasiitras.
His exposition of the first Sutra occupies the largest
space in his treatise, and this criticism appears under
the same division. ^ Ramanuja brings seven charges
against the doctrine of Maya. We reproduce the
gist of each, in order, with a criticism of our own.

I. The charge of ASraydnupapatti.

What is the a^raya (seat) of Maya (or avidya) ?
Residing in what does it produce illusion ? Surely

1- See Sribhasya, trans. Rangacarya and Varadaraja,
Madras, 1899, pp. 156-241

122 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

not in the individual self, because the selfhood of
the individual self is itself projected by avidya ;
neither could it reside in Brahnaan, since He has the
essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is
thus opposed to avidya (ignorance).

Criticism. — This objection rests upon a two-fold
misinterpretation. — In the first place, Ramanuja
starts with the idea that Maya (or Avidya) is some-
thing real, and consequently demands a seat for this
" illusion " or " ignorance." Avidya is decidedly not
a reality : it is only the negation of vidyd, or the
obscuration of it. As the fire is latent in the wood, so
is our godly nature, our spiritual principle, hidden by
the upadhis, In the second place, Ramanuja makes
an unwarranted differentiation between Brahman
and the individual soul. In stating the position of the
Advaitin he has no right to colour it with his own
conceptions. We, after Sankara, do not admit such
a difference between the two. Brahman becomes the
individual soul only by upadhis, i.e., self-imposed
limitations of manas, ten senses, subtle body. Karma,
etc. These upadhis may figuratively be spoken of
as limiting the Atman and resolving it into the two
aspects of the Highest Atman (Brahman) and the
individual Atman. If, therefore, we are pressed
by Ramanuja to state the residence of Avidya, we
may meet him by saying that it must, if at all con-
ceived as such, reside in the upadhis — the mind
(manas), the senses, etc. As a matter of fact, this
demand of Ramanuja seems to be unjustifiable and

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 123

inadmissible. It wholly rests upon his supposition
of the reality of Avidya.

2. The Charge of Tirodhdnanupapatti.

The supposed " ignorance " cannot, as main-
tained by its upholders, conceal Brahman, whose
essential nature is self-luminosity. The conceal-
ment of luminosity means either {a) the obstruction
of the origination of luminosity, or (6) the destruc-
tion of existing luminosity. But as it is held that
the luminosity of Brahman is incapable of being a
produced thing, the concealment of luminosity must
mean the destruction of luminosity, which, in other
words, amounts to the destruction of the essential
nature of Brahman.

Criticism. — ^This objection is based upon Rama-
nuja's losing hold of the real position of the upholders
of Maya. Our " ignorance " is merely negative.
It has no positive existence to be able to conceal
anything else in the strict sense. Brahman is ever
the same in its splendour and luminosity, but we fail
to see it only through our own avidya, which can,
therefore, in no way be said to be able to conceal
Brahman in the sense of destroying its limiinosity.
In the same way, if a follower of Ramanuja were to
ask Kant, " Why do we not see the thing-in-itself
(das ' Ding-an-sich ') ? " he would at once reply,
" Because between that and ourselves are the intel-
lectual forms {lipddhis) of Time, Space, and Causa-
lity." Thus we are not explaining away the diffi-
culty pointed out by Ramanuja when we say that

124 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

we deny the concealment (tirodhana) of Brahman by
ignorance (avidya).

3. The Charge of Svarupdnupapatti.

What is the essential nature of Avidya ? As long
as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of
reality or of unreality. But it is not admitted to be
a reality ; ^ and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long
as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman
Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible
to explain the theory of illusion. If Brahman Him-
self have the character of the misguiding error, then,
owing to his eternity, there would be no final release
to the individual self.

Criticism. — The whole difficulty is purely facti-
tious. Certainly we do not admit the reality of
Maya, but at the same time we do not hold that it is
unreal from the empirical standpoint as well.
Empirically it is sat (existing) : the world is, but it
is Maya. Ramanuja is too anxious and tactful to
corner us by his dilemmas. But as a rule these
dilemmas have one of the two horns already broken,
since he generally starts with self -assumed premises,
and draws his own inferences from them, most logic-
ally, of course.

The question as to what is the cause of Maya is,
in the sense in which it is asked, an illegitimate one.

1 Here Ramanuja rightly understands the standpoint,
but at once again makes a great confusion and becomes
inconsistent when criticizing the theory on the basis of the
assumed reality of Maya.

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 125

Causality is the general law in the world (in Maya),
but it has no warrant to transcend itself and ask,
" What is the cause of Maya ? " The category only
appUes within the phenomenal world, and at once
breaks down when stretched out of it. Everything
within Maya has a cause, but Maya has no cause.
The same fact would be stated by Kant in the words
"Causality is the imiversal law of the empirical
world". Hence the question as to causaUty being
meaningless in the present context, we are not
obliged to answer it.

Again, when Ramanuja suggests that " as long as
a real misguiding error, different from Brahman, is
not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the
theory," the suggestion seems to us to convey hardly
any meaning, since the moment we grant a real exist-
ence to Maya, our whole theory falls with it ; a real
dualism between the two realities (facing each other)
will be at once created, and this will in no way afford
even the slightest explanation of the theory. We
wonder how Ramanuja himself would try to explain
the theory even on these dualistic premises. The
whole of this charge, therefore, is imaginary and
futile.

4. The Charge of Anirvacaniyatvanupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanlya,
i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an
entity {sat) nor a non-entity [asat). To hold such a
view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities
or non-entities ; and if it be held that the object of

126 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

a cognition has neither the positive characteristics
of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a
non-entity, then all things may become the objects
of all cognitions.

Criticism. — ^This difficulty is couched in a very
clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a
misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly
what the " tertium comparationis " is in each case.
Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions,
and to say that a thing (" an object of cognition ")
is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it
at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly
different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is
not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an
" entity " nor a " non-entity." It is not sat, since
the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it
appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself
as an iva {" as it were "). Where is the contradic-
tion now ? Does not this very fact allow us to
speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable
of a strict definition ?

5. The charge of Pramdndnupapatti.

Is there any means by which this curious avidyd
is brought within the range of our cognition ? It
can neither be proved by perception nor by infer-
ence. Neither can it be established by revelation,
as the scriptural passages can be explained other-
wise.

Criticism. — In the light of what we have said

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 127

above this objection stands self-condemned. When
we do not believe in the real existence of Maya, what
logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence
of it ? If we had granted its reality, then indeed
we could be called upon to name the source of its
knowledge — perception, inference, revelation, etc.
However, to prove the validity of our conception we
do not require any marshalled arguments or formal
syllogisms. It is as clear as anything, when we
recall to our mind the nature of avidya, which, as we
have shown after Sankara, is an erroneous transfer
of the things and relations of the objective world to
the Self in the strictest sense of the word.

Further, Ramanuja examines a few scriptural
passages, and giving them another interpretation,
infers that all such passages can be so explained as
not to corroborate the theory of Avidya. He might
draw any meaning out of the few passages he has
gone into, so long as he is bent upon showing the
untenableness of Maya, but there still remains a
large number of passages, among which the meta-
physics of Yajnavalkya occupies a prominent place,
that defy all such attempts at a forced, far-fetched
and perverted interpretation.

When we know that we are in reality no other
than the Absolute Spirit, and that the Atman is the
only reality ; and yet we feel that we are different
from the Absolute and that the world in which we
live, move and have our being, is real, to what shall
we attribute this clash between our knowledge and

128 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

feelings ? Is it not a mystery ? And what else
could we say but that this is due to our ignorance,
the " erroneous transference " spoken of above ?

6. The Charge of Nivartakdnupapatti.

This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the
cessation of avidyd takes place solely by means of the
knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for
its object. Brahman is not without attributes and
qualities, since there are many passages which prove
that He is possessed of these. Moreover, the gram-
matical equations, such as " Tattvam asi " (" That art
Thou "), do not denote the oneness of any attribute-
less thing, they are not intended to give rise to the
stultification of any illusion due to avidyd ; but they
simply show that Brahman is capable of existing in
two different modes or forms. The universe is the
body of which Brahman is the soul. He is Himself
all the three entities — God, soul and matter. Con-
sequently, the knowledge which has an attributeless
Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot be
the complete knowledge of truth ; and obviously
such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the
attributeless Brahman cannot be the remover of the
avidyd postulated by the Advaitins.

Criticism. — The force of this objection lies mainly
in the supposition that " Brahman is not without
attributes," and it is further pointed out by Rama-
nuja that many passages of the Sruti prove this
thesis. In the light of Saiikara's Advaita, as briefly
described in Chapter II. we fail to see the force of

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 129

this argument. To say that there are some scrip-
tural passages bearing out the assertion may equally
be met by the counter-proposition that there are
also passages countenancing the attributelessness of
Brahman. If, then, both these assertions neutralize
each other from the scriptural point of view, one
may well ask. What then is the real trend and pur-
port of the Vaidic thought ? It seems to us that
this question could not be better answered than by
repeating the doctrine of Sankara when he attempted
to synthesize the whole of the Sruti by taking a wide
conspectus of its purport. All passages which
speak of the qualified Brahman may be placed under
Apard vidyd, while para wiU include only those that
expound the metaphysical truth as it is. Brahman
may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as
" with attributes," but the ultimate truth remains
that He is really " without attributes." Besides, the
conception of the Absolute in the strict sense leaves
hardly any room for "attributes." Impose any
attributes and you at once make the Absolute
" non-absolute," i.e., destroy his very nature by
making paricchinna (hmited) that which is aparic-
chinna (without limits).

Again, Ramanuja denies that the text, " Tat
tvam asi," denotes the oneness of the individual with
the attributeless Universal, and holds that it simply
brings out Brahman's capability of existing in two
forms or modes. Now, this seems to us to be an
ambiguous use of language. That Brahman exists

130 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

in two opposite forms will be meaningless if one of
the forms were not supposed to be due to Avidya.
How can a being exist in two contradictory forms ?
at and acit are two opposite notions in the system of
Ramanuja, but he has not succeeded in reconcihng
their existence by merely saying that they are two
modes of the Absolute. To picture the universe as
the body of Brahman is after all a mere analogy,
which hardly makes the matter even a jot clearer.
Even by investing God with all auspicious attri-
butes, how will Ramanuja account for the existence
of evil (moral) or error (psychological) ? Simply
to say, as did Plato, that God is good, hence the
universe must be good, is no explanation, but a
mere shirking of the question. Like Plato, Rama-
nuja uses many analogies and metaphors while
speaking of Brahman, but the Advaitist cannot
but take all these as mere mythical representa-
tions.

Hence, with our denial of the qualified aspect of
Brahman as a metaphysical truth is linked the denial
of " the impossibihty of the knowledge which has an
attributeless Brahman for its object."

Avidya being like darkness is itself expelled when
light comes in. JMna is the remover of ajndna.
As we have already pointed out above, the expression
" knowledge of Brahman " is strictly inadmissible,
since Brahman is itself knowledge {J nana) — of course
the term being used in the higher sense of " pure
consciousness."

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 131

7. The Charge of Nivrtiyanupapatti.

The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical
" ignorance " is quite impossible. The individual
soul's bondage of " ignorance " is determined by
Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot there-
fore be removed by any abstract knowledge — but
only by divine worship and grace. Moreover,
according to the Advaitins the differentiation be-
tween the knower, knowledge, and the known is
unreal ; and even that knowledge, which is capable
of removing avidya has to be unreal and has to
stand in need of another real removing knowledge.

Criticism. — Our struggle with Karma is undoubt-
edly real so long as our consciousness- of the true
nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its
determinations, and with it everything else, is sup-
posed to be real, but only so far. We have already
quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and
unequivocally makes this concession, " vydvahdric-
ally " (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of
view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called " a
concrete reality," but with the explicit understand-
ing that such a reality is after all " phenomenal."
We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of
one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman ;
such a man, being free from all desires and motives,
all springs of action, is pari passu beyond the con-
trol of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh
and new Karma for himself. The laws oi Karma
are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do

132 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

they produce any real knowledge to the Atman,
whose very nature forbids all such bondages.

The idea of divine worship and grace may be sup-
ported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable
to go round the higher path of pure knowledge.
But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted
conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible
when there is a direct and perfect communion — ^in
other words, an " identity " — between the two forms
of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ulti-
mate nature of man and God is " Consciousness."
So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the
acquirement of " knowledge " — which alone is
capable of ousting its opponent — ^liberation is im-
possible. Without such a knowledge, mere devo-
tion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.

As to the differentiation between the knower
(jnata), knowledge (jiiana), and the known (jneya),
we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly
fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us
and it is real for all our practical purposes. The
metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour
the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge
removing avidya — if we are at aU to say " removal "
of avidya — is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot
destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of
a relation between " subject " and " object " is of
course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give
a deathblow to avidya. On the dawning of true
knowledge the artificial distinction between " sub-

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 133

ject " and " object " vanishes. " By what shall we
know the knower (the subject of all knowledge) ? "
as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.

These are in brief the seven difficvdties which
Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As
will appear from what we have said above, Rama-
nuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunder-
standing of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All
through he has been treating Maya as if it were a
concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc.
We do not accuse him even because he attempted to
reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his
consistency, when even on his own premises he
falls short of furnishing a really adequate explana-
tion of the relation between God and the Universe.
His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt
to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians,
who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy
to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evi-
dent that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much
further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal concep-
tion of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if
there is any real meaning in " personality." This
is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such
doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of
the divine personality.

Now, coming to the objections of the Piirnapra-
jiias — ^who hold the absolute separateness of the
individual soul and Brahman — it is obvious that the
general drift of their attacks must be directed against

134 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the Advaitist's doctrine of the identity of the two.
The Jiva, they say, being hmited (paricchinna) is
distinct from Brahman. One of the followers of
this school of Madhva speaks of the Advaitins in the
following contemptuous and polemic fashion —

" There are certain disputants, sunk in a sea of false
logic, addicted to an evil way, filled with a hundred imagin-
ations of idle babble, deceived themselves and deceiving
the world, who say, ' I am Brahman, and all this universe
also is Brahman,' which is now shown to be an empty desire.
If I and all this Universe were Brahman, then there would
be an identity between thee and me ; thy wealth, sons and
wife would be mine, and mine would be thine, for there would
be no distinction between us." i

To show the futility of such arguments it is suffi-
cient only to state them as such. This criticism quite
ignores San^ara's repeated warning that the ideal
unreality of the world does not deprive it of its empiric
reality, and ii^ empiric reality all the distinctions are
observed. The criticism is further couched in rather
crude language. We are not surprised that a mis-
understanding of the Advaita standpoint may lead
one to urge such silly charges against it as are em-
bodied in the quotation just noted.

The school of Vallabha has not entered into con-
flict with the theory of Maya, but it has pointed
out the unteiiableness of Ramanuja's standpoint.
Ramanuja, as we have seen, only qualified the origi-

1 See Taitvamuktdvali of Piirnananda, trans, by Cowell
(JRAS., vol. XV. part ii.), Sloka 87-88.

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 135

nal Advaita ; but Vallabha thought of purifying it
altogether. It could not be held that Brahman,
which is all cit, should be in inseparable union with
acit. This would have been a contradiction in
terms, and would have soiled the doctrine of the
Upanisads.i Brahman was therefore supposed to
become by its will. Now, this tendency to question
the validity of Ramanuja's standpoint went so far
as to keep the school of VaUabha away from dis-
cussing the theory of Maya. While Ramanuja
made it a point to use all means at his disposal to
bring the doctrine of Maya into discredit (and so too
did Madhva after him), VaUabha stood up to criti-
cize Ramanuja. That is why we do not find any
special charges preferred by him against " Maya."
Of course, this does not mean that he endorsed the
theory, but simply that he did not meddle with the
right or wrong of the question, and was content to
establish his own views in reference to a criticism of
Ramanuja's. Hence we now pass on to an examina-
tion of some of the other objections, which are not
raised strictly within the Vedanta.

Sankara has discussed at length the controversy
between the Sahkhya and the Vedanta. InAdhyayai.
he has estabhshed the main principles of Vedanta,
and in Adhyaya ii. has attempted a thorough-going
inquiry into the various objections preferred by the
Sankhyas (ii. 2. i-io), Vaisesikas (ii. 2. 11-17), Budd-
hists (ii. 218-32), Jainas (33-36), Pa^upatas (37-41),
'^ See Dvivedi, Monism or Advaitism, p. 104.

136 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

Pancaratras (42-45), etc. The physico-theological
proof is first taken up, and it is shown how the Pra-
dhana (non-intelligent matter, an equilibrium of the
three gunas) cannot evolve itself spontaneously into
multiform modifications. An earthen jar though
springing from clay does not itself come into exist-
ence without the co-operation of an intelligent being,
viz., the potter. From the impossibility of the
orderly arrangement of the world and the impossi-
bility of activity a non-intelligent cause of the world
is not to be inferred. Activity may of course
belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is
observed, but in every case it results from an intelli-'
gent principle, because it exists when the latter is
present and not otherwise. The motive-power of
intelligence is incontrovertible.

It may be objected that on the Vedantic premises
there is no room for a moving power, as in conse-
quence of the non-duahty of Brahman no motion is
possible. But, says Sankara, such objections have
been refuted by pointing to the fact of the Lord
being fictitiously connected with Maya, which con-
sists of name and form presented by Avidy a. Hence
motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of a
non-inteUigent first cause.

We cannot enter into this question at any length,
since, as we have already said, as regards the nature
of Brahman as the Cause of the world and the possi-
bility or otherwise of assuming any other such cause,
this conception of "causality" is not tenable in the

OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE VEDANTA 137

purely idealistic sense, and the moment any such
category is introduced the Absolute (Brahman) is
conceived as Phenomenal (mayopahita).

After a careful criticism of the atomic theory of
the VaiSesikas Sankara proceeds to discuss the
doctrine of the Buddhists (ii. 2. 18-32). That
doctrine, as he observes, is presented in a variety of
forms, due either to the difference of the views main-
tained by Buddha at different times, or else to the
difference of capacity on the part of the disciples of
Buddha. Three principal opinions may, however,
be distinguished —

(i) Realists, who maintain the reality of every-
thing — SarvdsHtvavdda [Savtrdntikas and
Vaibhdsikas).

(2) Idealists, who maintain the reaUty of thought

only — 'Vijndnavddins (Yogdcaras).

(3) Nihilists, who maintain that everything is

sunya (void, unreal) — Sunyavddins (Ma-
dhyamikas).

The criticism of each of these is set forth with great
perspicacity in Sankara, and it is needless for us to
go over the same ground again. All this bears on
our subject only indirectly.

All the chief objections to Maya rest upon a mis-
conception, viz., to take it as a reality. Even the
criticism of Thibaut in his introduction to the Vedan-
tasutras (S.B.E., vol. xxxiv.) rests upon the same sort
of misconception. It is exceedingly difficult to free
one's mind from a theistic bias when approaching

138 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the doctrine of Maya. In Chapter II we have at-
tempted to show how the idea of Maya existed
much earlier than the word Maya (in the technical
sense) and that in itself is a refutation of the main
thesis of scholars like Thibaut and others who sup-
pose that the conception of Maya was a late offshoot
in the Vedanta, being specially fabricated by
Sankara.

On a future occasion we hope to supplement the
present treatment of Maya by an examination of
the various analogies of the concept in the philo-
sophy of the West and some other eastern countries.
It may also be possible to summarize critically the
views of all the other systems of Indian philosophy
on the question of the relation of the Absolute to
the Universe. That will be a proper occasion for
recapitulating a criticism of Buddhism, Jainism,
Sankhya, etc.

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